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‘Procedure is not pure form. It is the meeting point of conflicts, of policies, of ideas. 
It is the ‘Cape Wrath’ where Rapidity and Efficiency have to be combined with 
Justice; it is also the ‘Cape of Good Hope’ where Individual Liberty has to be 
combined with Equality of Opportunities. Procedure is, in fact, the faithful mirror of 
all the major exigencies, problems, and trials of our epoch – of the immense 
challenge of our time. Here, my fellow proceduralists, is our challenge. Here is our 
work.’ 
 
Mauro Cappelletti1  
                                                
1 In ‘Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure’ 1970-71, p. 886. 

  
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of arbitration is originally a simple one. The reason for chosing arbitration 
instead of legal court proceedings could for instance be that arbitration makes possible 
the achieving of a different, ‘better’ right for the parties.2 Disputing parties agree to 
submit their disagreement to a person whose expertise or judgment they trust. In short, 
arbitration is considered an effective way of obtaining a final and binding decision on a 
dispute without reference to a public court.3 Although arbitration represents an old 
mechanism 4  of alternative dispute resolution outside public courts, arbitration 
proceedings comprise several inherent legal issues, which, if disputed, have to be 
submitted to the national courts for a final decision. Examples of these issues are 
disputes concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, requests for provisional measures, 
disputes regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards and the validity of arbitration 
agreements5. Thus, arbitration proceedings are never completely exempted from the 
influence of national courts. The language of the Brussels I Regulation, however, does 
not fully indicate in which cases the scope of the arbitration exception in Article 1(2)(d) 
covers these specific questions and when the Regulation becomes applicable in practice.  
 
1.1 Background 
The Brussels I Regulation6 governs arbitration proceedings in the European Union 
(EU).7 More specifically, they are governed through an exclusion clause stipulated in 
Article 2(1)(d) of the Regulation. The most famous preliminary ruling by the European 
                                                
2 Lindskog 2012, p. 43. 
3 Blackaby et al. 2012, p. 2. 
4 Even though modern arbitration nowadays is mainly linked to commercial law, the practice originates 
from the Middle Ages. Koulu 2008, p. 498. 
5 On the term ’arbitration agreement’, see Panico, R. C., Reform of the Brussels I-Regulation: the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction, in Ferrari & Kröll 2012, p. 96-97. 
6  Council Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the regonition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12 of January 16 2001. Hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the Regulation’. 
7 The Regulation is more specifically referred to as Brussels I Regulation to keep it separate from Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, the so called Brussels II regulation. 
  
2 
Court of Justice8 is the West Tankers case9 from 2009, in which the Court interpreted 
the arbitration exclusion in the Regulation narrowly. In practice, this watered down the 
arbitration exclusion. The Court’s ruling in West Tankers contained among other things 
the remark that if the the nature of the subject matter in a dispute, i.e. the nature of the 
rights to be protected, comes within the scope of application of the Regulation, then a 
preliminary issue concerning the main dispute will also come within its scope of 
application. In other words, preliminary proceedings relating to arbitration might, 
according to the Court, fall within the scope of application of the Regulation (depending 
on the subject matter of the primary issue) and therefore outside the arbitration 
exclusion clause. Among some commentators critique against the Court for its influence 
on arbitration in the EU has been loud. A concrete consequence of West Tankers is that 
issuing an anti-suit injunction10 to prevent parallel proceedings is deemed inconsistent 
with the Regulation, since actions like this may be used maliciously in order to limit a 
national court’s right to decide on its own jurisdiction, and is therefore prohibited under 
the Regulation. 
 
Anti-suit injunctions represent a type of procedural tactics, which have little, if any, 
effect outside common law countries.11 At first sight, anti-suit injunctions interfering 
with arbitration do not raise the same criticism levelled at traditional anti-suit 
injunctions because they do not directly interfere with the jurisdiction of a national 
court. They may seem advantageous when they are pronounced to stay proceedings in 
favour of an arbitration clause. Arbitration injunctions can have two different 
                                                
8 Hereinafter referred to as ’the Court’ as meaning both the the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and its predecessor, the European Court of Justice. 
9 Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers Inc. (2009) ECR I-
663. 
10 An anti-suit injunction is a prohibition that a court in one Member State issues with the intention to 
stop a person from bringing or maintaining action in a court in another Member State as a weapon against 
foreign court proceedings violating an arbitration agreement. See Introduction to the work Gaillard, 
Emmanuel (ed.). Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration. International Arbitration Institute, IAI 
Seminar Paris – November 21, 2003. Juris Publishing Inc. New York 2005. Gaillard 2005, p. 1-2; 
Arbitration-related anti-suit injunctions essentially come in two varieties: they are either directed at 
foreign court proceedings which have been commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement, or directed 
at defective arbitral proceedings which are ongoing. Neither case is specifically dealt with in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. For more, see Bachand, Frederic. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law’s Take on Anti-Suit Injunctions in Gaillard 2005. 
11 Anti-suit injunctions tend to be issued only by common law courts; the vast majority of court systems 
in the EU are civil law systems, which tend to have strong negative views of anti-suit injunctions and 
would not be likely to grant them in any case. For more on anti-suit injunctions in this context, see e.g. 
Rainer 2010, p. 433-434, and Ambrose 2008, p. 416-424. 
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objectives: to restrain the implementation of arbitration proceedings or to prevent 
actions for enforcement of arbitral awards.12 A so-called ‘torpedo action’ refers to a 
malicious attempt by a party to prevent the opposing party from bringing its claim 
before another national court or an arbitration tribunal, and is therefore considered an 
abusive form of litigation tactics, potentially harming international arbitration. The use 
of torpedo actions would essentially mean that a party might be prevented from bringing 
its claim before a national court if the opposing party files its law suit in another 
national court first, since the court first seised will gain jurisdiction forcing the court 
seised second to decline jurisdiction. Such tactics run counter to the principle of mutual 
trust, which serves as a foundation of the judicial cooperation in the EU and contradict 
its spirit. 
 
Case law of the Court has shown that the scope of application of the Regulation and the 
arbitration exclusion in it depends on the substantive subject matter of the dispute in 
question. If that subject matter falls within the scope of the Regulation, a court which 
has jurisdiction under the Regulation is entitled to examine whether the arbitration 
exception applies and, depending on its assessment of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, to refer the case to the arbitral body or adjudicate the matter itself.13 One of 
the fundamental objectives of international arbitration is to ensure that (unless the 
parties agree otherwise) disputes will not be resolved in accordance with the procedures 
of one party's - and not the other party's - home jurisdiction, which may favour, 
explicitly or implicitly, one party over the other. 14 Court proceedings parallel to 
arbitration proceedings could lead to two conflicting decisions based on the same legal 
substance and subsequently creating a confusing situation. 
 
When it was revealed that a revision of the Regulation was being prepared, arbitration 
stakeholders expected to receive a solution to questions like the abolishment of the 
                                                
12  Lew, Julian D. M. Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts. To Prevent Arbitration 
Proceedings. In Gaillard 2005, p. 26. 
13  See Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA, formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA and Generali 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc., Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para. 44. 
14 Born 2009, p. 1001. See the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards Article V(1)(b) of 10 June 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (permitting the refusal to 
recognize and enforce an arbitral award where the parties are not on equal footing because the party 
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present a case). 
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possibility of parallel proceedings, which had been the purpose of issuing anti-suit 
injunctions. The European Commission identified the Regulation’s main deficiencies in 
its report on the application of the Regulation.15 The issues identified in the report 
involved among other matters the scope of application of the Regulation on arbitration 
proceedings. 
 
The new Regulation will become applicable on matters issued as of 10 January 2015. 
The result of the revision is that the arbitration exclusion remains unchanged, however 
with an added recital in the preamble. This has left arbitration stakeholders and legal 
scholars somewhat confused concerning the reasons for keeping the arbitration 
exclusion unaltered in the revised Regulation. 
 
1.2 Approach to the problem and research method 
The Regulation is considered the most important legal document in the area of civil 
procedure on EU level. It is also the sole piece of EU procedural legislation that 
explicitly mentions arbitration. The section in question excludes arbitration from the 
scope of application of the Regulation, in order to better comply with international 
legislation, especially the New York Convention. Regulation (EU) No 1215/201216 
enters into application on 10 January 2015.17 Naturally, it is difficult to provide any 
concrete answers regarding the future legal situation in advance. It is left to the Court to 
rule in the matter of the scope of application of the new Regulation and the effect of the 
new recitals concerning arbitration proceedings. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an illustration of past and future case law by 
analysing legislation, preparatory work, articles, commentaries and, of course, central 
case law of the Court. Accordingly, the purpose of this work is also to clarify the scope 
of application of the Regulation in arbitration proceedings. It examines the reasons 
behind keeping the arbitration exclusion clause unaltered in the new Regulation; there is 
                                                
15 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 174 final. 
16 OJ L 351 of 12 December 2012, p. 1. Hereinafter referred to as ‘the new Regulation’. 
17 COM (2013) 554 final, p.2. 
  
5 
no clear consensus among legal scholars and their interpretations of the future legal 
situation regarding the regulation of arbitration in the EU. The question also 
encompasses a dimension of complicated situations of conflicting legal principles and 
different objects of legal protection when interpreting the application of EU law in 
general, e.g. the principle of mutual trust between Member States and the competence of 
national courts to decide on their own jurisdiction in a specific case. 
 
 1.2.1 Subject and research question 
 
The principal question of this thesis ‘Where are we heading?’ needs an answer because 
of the numerous question marks concerning de lege ferenda in this particular area of EU 
law. To answer this the subject of the research has been divided into three questions: 1) 
what are the factors that have led to the current legal situation in the area of EU civil 
procedure, in particular concerning arbitration, 2) what does the revision of the 
Regulation signify in practice, and 3) what will the standpoint of the Court potentially 
be in future arbitration proceedings in the light of i.e. West Tankers and based on the 
new Regulation. 
 
To answer these questions a general review of the revision of the Regulation is 
provided, along with an analysis of central case law as well as hypothetical case law 
based on the new Regulation. The thesis ends with the author’s conclusive remarks. 
 
This thesis is mainly based on the Regulation and its preparatory work, e.g. reports and 
opinions from various bodies and institutions of the EU. The case law of the Court, 
commentary on the revision, legal literature on international arbitration and civil 
procedure in the EU along with procedural principles and terminology are discussed and 
explained. International views on commercial arbitration and the role of the New York 
Conventions are also taken into account. This thesis also touches upon the role of the 
Court as a creator and interpreter of EU legislation and the debate around its influence 
on the legislative development in the EU. 
 
As the new Regulation will become applicable only in 2015, it is impossible to provide 
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any watertight truths in the matter. This thesis presents a general picture of the 
development and brings forth different views on whether the revision answers its 
purpose, and what that purpose de facto is. 
 
The subject of this thesis is relevant because of the fact that the Regulation specifically 
states that arbitration falls outside its scope of application. Nevertheless, the stance of 
the Court in West Tankers, which concerned the matter of a national court’s jurisdiction 
and the use of anti-suit injunctions, was that the Regulation became applicable. The 
Court took the position that the principle of the free circulation of judgments has a 
stronger foothold in supranational relations in the EU than general principles of 
arbitration, and that the Regulation thus becomes applicable in certain circumstances. 
Arbitration practitioners have argued that this ruling weakens the arbitration exclusion 
in practice, prohibiting the use of anti-suit injunctions, and potentially contributes to the 
EU becoming an unfavourable centre for arbitration due to the lack of transparency and 
the risk of jeopardising the purposes of chosing arbitration as a dispute resolution 
method.18  
 
1.2.2 Method 
 
The complexity of the problems in this thesis essentially revolves around the arbitration 
exclusion in Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation. The attitude towards the exclusion has 
been quite nuanced since the inclusion into the Brussels Convention19. There are 
different opinions regarding the content of a particular norm and its EU law context, and 
the question really is about whether the norm in question is linked to EU law or not and 
thus whether EU law becomes applicable at all. 
 
This thesis is mainly based on legal dogmatics research. EU law constitutes sui 
generis20-law, as purposes and principles of EU law differ from what we are used to in 
                                                
18 Parties agree to international arbitration with the objective of obtaining dispute resolution procedures 
that streamline the arbitral proceedings and allow a speedy, efficient, and expert result. See Born 2009, p. 
1002 and Koulu 2008, p. 499. 
19 Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. 
20 See e.g. case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 1, p.12. 
  
7 
national law, and thus requires a scrutiny based on other methods of interpretation.21 In 
a legal context, sui generis is a term of art used to identify a legal classification that 
exists independently of other categorisations because of its singularity or due to the 
specific creation of an entitlement or obligation. The disciplines of legal research can be 
divided into three wholes, viz. legal dogmatic, legal theory and general sciences of 
law.22 The general sciences of law include e.g. legal theory and legal economics. A 
common direction has been the discipline of legal dogmatics, the research object of 
which is prevailing law. Legal dogmatics involves the stance regarding norms and the 
interpretation of norms. 
 
Prevailing law has been given a definition by Alf Ross. According to Ross, the assertion 
in legal dogmatics that a rule is valid signifies a statement that the rule will be applied in 
future public authority decisions.23 In line with the definition, legal dogmatics is to Ross 
an empirical science in this context. The object for legal dogmatics is the world of ‘is’, 
i.e. the valid norms and the traditional task is interpretation and systematising of the 
law.24 The method in this work is mainly legal dogmatic, but it also holds a viewpoint 
on the world of ‘ought’, since it encompasses an analysis and hypothesis on future 
application of a certain norm in EU procedural law.25 In other words, it is a matter of an 
examination de lege ferenda. More specifically this thesis examines European civil 
procedural law. 
 
Koulu, for instance, examines the possible ‘europeanisation’ of procedural law research 
on a national level.26 According to him, it is obvious that research in procedural law has 
changed due to fundamental conversions that have occurred in the societal and 
economic framework into which its research subject, conflict resolution (the process), is 
positioned. We have switched to talking about conflict management or conflict 
resolution that encompasses both traditional procedural law and the new framework. 
                                                
21 Raitio 2013, p. 6. 
22 Hirvonen 2011, p. 21. See also Aarnio 1997, p. 36. 
23 Jyränki 1997, p. 76. 
24 Hirvonen 2011, p. 22. 
25 For an assessment on legal realism, see e.g. Koskenniemi, M. Introduction: Alf Ross and Life Beyond 
Realism. Koskenniemi 2003, pp. 654-659. 
26 Koulu 2012, p. 492. 
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Research like this is bound to be multidimensional and empirical.27 According to Koulu, 
it is safe to say that modern procedural law is broader and more diverse, theoretical and 
international than traditional procedural law.28 The europeanisation-thesis is confirmed 
by the EU’s legislative power. However, Koulu believes that the influence of EU law 
occurs in an area that is too limited, since it covers only supranational court 
proceedings.29 
 
Legal dogmatics also comprehends a demand for research on what additional material 
affects prevailing law. The research contains not only systematisation and interpretation 
of prevailing law, but also other material that affects the norm, e.g. preparatory work 
and case law.30 When EU law is at hand, the interpretation emphasises the interaction 
between the Treaties, directed rights and case law.31 The importance of fundamental and 
human rights is also stressed in the evaluation. As we know, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights32 is on the same level as the founding Treaties as of 2010, and 
therefore constitutes binding law in the application and exercise of EU law. 
 
In this case, Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation constitutes the examined norm in 
question. The semantic of the norm is however not quite clear. In other words, the 
content of the wording is not as clear as it prima facie would appear. Since this work 
quite extensively deals with EU law, certain legal principles of EU law become topical. 
Legal dogmatics also involves research concerning the positioning in issues of balance 
between legal principles. In EU law, legal principles are often disputed in relation to 
each other and questions of which interests are more important become relevant to solve 
a certain imbalance. 
 
The point of departure of this thesis is EU civil procedural law, which is complicated in 
the sense that the task takes place on many different legal (and partially political) levels. 
In order to perform this analytical framework one needs to examine the subject through 
                                                
27 Ibid, p. 494. 
28 Ibid, p. 495. 
29 Ibid, p. 496. 
30 Hirvonen 2011, p. 23. 
31 Raitio 2010, p. 5. 
32 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326 of 26 October 2012. 
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‘EU spectacles’, which demands a certain connaissance of methods and theories used in 
the research of EU norms and principles. Legal research always demands certain 
theoretical choices and ponderings before any analyse can be done.33 Theories used in 
the research of EU law may be e.g. economic or constitutional. When it comes to the 
study of the EU Internal Market, many integration theories have gained foothold.34 In 
this particular work I will not attempt to apply any EU theories, since it is not apt in this 
particular task. 
 
Regarding principles of interpretation, EU law constitutes its own outsider system, and 
different principles are applied than those applied on national legislation. Analysing the 
case law of the Court is also challenging, since the deliberations of the judges are not 
public. When it comes to arbitration, the lack of predictability and confidentiality are 
particularly sensitive matters, because of the fact that the whole purpose of arbitration is 
to facilitate dispute resolution in trade relations and to render the dispute resolution 
process effective. 
 
1.3 Scope and delimitation 
This thesis encompasses questions of procedural legislation on EU level, in this case, 
primarily the Regulation and its background, along with its revision. It does not include 
a description of international arbitration due to its extent and complexity. Nor does it 
include any deeper plummeting into the world of procedural tactics used in international 
arbitration.35 However, the work provides a brief linkage to international conventions, 
since they affect the overall regulation of arbitration. The New York Convention for 
instance is directly entwined with the Regulation, and all Member States are members 
of the New York Convention. 
 
This thesis mainly examines the scope of the arbitration exclusion in Article 1(2)(d) of 
the Regulation. The issue of the scope of the exclusion constituted only one part of the 
                                                
33 Raitio 2013, p. 2. 
34 See e.g. Raitio 2003, p. 59-62. 
35 The complexity of anti-suit injunctions is illustrated in Baum, Axel H. Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by 
National Courts. To Permit Arbitration Proceedings. In Gaillard 2005, p. 20. 
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overall revision of the Regulation, however, it is one of the most discussed objects of 
the amendment. There are some confusing factors regarding the new Regulation’s 
preparatory work, e.g. the fact that the original plan to include arbitration into the scope 
of the new Regulation ended up being rejected, and the arbitration exclusion remained 
unaltered. This thesis thus concentrates on analysing the different standpoints in the 
preparatory documents and the result of the revision, especially the added recital (12) in 
the preamble. 
 
Regarding case law, the Court’s preliminary rulings constitute central objects of analyse 
in this work. Naturally, the case law is highly important because of the fact that it sets 
the pace of the future and constitutes binding law for all Member States to follow. The 
very reason for the ongoing debate is also the judgments given by the Court on the 
interpretation of the Regulation and the scope of Article 1(2)(d). The guidelines of the 
Court are rather clear, but the question is what effect recital 12 will have on arbitration 
proceedings in the future. This thesis analyses this question as well. 
 
1.4 Structure 
The structure of this thesis is based on a chronological order of happenings. A very tight 
EU arbitration package is provided in the following Chapter 2 as well as an attempt to 
illustrate the happenings on the arbitration scene in the EU. After the information 
feature follows a presentation of case law of the Court concerning the interface between 
arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 a systematic run-
through of the renewal process of the Regulation is presented, as well as an account and 
analyse of the preparatory work. 
 
The thesis ends with a simulation of the most central Court judgments concerning the 
interface between the Regulation and arbitration is presented in Chapter 5. The same 
Chapter also encloses an analysis of the outcome and future prospects. The work is 
finalised in Chapter 6, which includes a brief summary and the author’s analysis. 
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2 ARBITRATION IN THE EU IN A NUTSHELL 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) imposes a duty on the 
EU to develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications.36 
Such cooperation may be based on the adoption of measures for the approximation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States. Thus, as one imperative of the TFEU, 
judicial cooperation in civil matters aims to tackle obstacles deriving from 
incompatibilities between the various legal and administrative systems by means of 
closer cooperation between the authorities of Member States.37 The main pillar is 
thereby the principle of mutual recognition and the enforcement of judgments and of 
decisions resulting from extrajudicial cases, which is prescribed in Article 81(1) 
TFEU.38 
The policy area of ‘judicial cooperation in civil matters’ applies to civil matters ‘having 
cross-border implications’. The objective is to facilitate access to justice and enhance 
legal security and predictability in litigation, which in some way has a link to at least 
two Member Sates. Some of the examples of more specific objectives listed in Article 
81(2) TFEU do not expressly refer to cross-border situations39, but it is submitted that 
they should be read in the light of the first paragraph and its reference to cross-border 
implications.40 
 
As an important milestone in enhancing the judicial cooperation in compliance with its 
duty set out by the TFEU, the Council of the EU adopted the Regulation.41 The 
                                                
36 Article 81(1) TFEU reads as follows: The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters 
having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of 
decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.   
37 In the study of judicial cooperation in civil matters the emphasis is mainly on procedural rules, but 
according to commentators, it is situated at the crossroads of procedural law, private international law, 
and EU law. See Storskrubb 2008, p. 9-12. 
38 Rosas & Armati, p. 191. 
It may be noted that this necessarily implies cooperation between courts and authorities that is founded on 
the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust: certain acts of secondary law as well as the case law 
of the Court makes this explicit. 
39 For instance, sub-paragraph (e) simply mentions ’effective access to justice’. 
40 Rosas & Armati, p. 191. 
41 Storskrubb 2008, p. 136. 
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Regulation lays down rules governing the jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. 
It supersedes the Brussels Convention of 1968, which was applicable between the EU 
Member States before the Regulation entered into force. The Regulation specifically 
excludes arbitration from its scope, in order to give way to international agreements, 
such as the New York Convention.42 Despite the positive effects achieved by clear 
common rules introduced by the Regulation, in some areas its application opened up 
possibilities for abuse contrary to the interests of justice and legal certainty.43 
 
2.1 Brief overview of the Brussels I Regulation 
As with the other parts of what is now the area of freedom, security and justice, judicial 
cooperation in civil matters started outside the Treaty framework in the form of 
conventions concluded between some or all of the Member States. One example of 
early action is the Brussels Convention44. The original EEC Treaty45 enjoined the 
Member States to enter into negotiations with one another with a view to simplifying 
the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
Based on the provision in Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, the Member States negotiated 
the Brussels Convention. Consequently, it was considered to be linked to the scope of 
the Treaty and its purpose to facilitate the function of the common market, and thus give 
rise to an extensive body of case law from the Court.46 
 
However, it became generally recognised that intergovernmental forms of cooperation 
were too slow and too fragmental to guarantee satisfactory results. Using the legal 
bases, which had been introduced by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Community 
legislator started to adopt regulations, in other words legislation directly applicable in 
                                                
42 See supra note 16. 
43 The Committee on Legal Affairs of 15 October 2012 on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (recast) (COM (2010) 748—C7-0433/2010—2010/0383(COD)), p.140.  
44 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. On the history and development of the Brussels Convention, see e.g. Fletcher 1982, 
p. 103-111. 
45 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community of 25 March 1957. 
46 Rosas & Armati, p. 191. 
See e.g. Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester (1994) ECR I-467, para. 11. 
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the Member States.47 
 
The Regulation forms one of the sets of rules representing the Brussels Regime48. Its 
detailed rules assign jurisdiction for the dispute to be heard and governs the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Brussels Regime consists of three bodies of 
regulations: the Brussels Convention49, the Lugano Convention50 and the Regulation. 
The scope of the Regulation is the same as for the Convention that it superseded.51  
 
According to Article 29352 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), 
the Member States are obliged to enter into negotitations as far as it is necessary, in 
order to ensure access to justice for its citizens and to enhance the principle of mutual 
trust and the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions and arbitral awards. The 
Brussels Convention, and particularly the Court on the application of the Convention, 
has had a remarkable effect on the international procedural cooperation in the EU. 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 The Brussels Regime refers to a set of rules regulating the question of jurisdiction in legal disputes of 
civil or commercial nature between parties resident in different Member States of the EU and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
49 The Brussels Convention has now been reincarnated in the form of the Brussels I Regulation.  
Moreover, an equivalent regulation in the field of family law, the Brussels II Regulation (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility), has brought jurisdictional and mutual recognition 
issues in such matters as divorce proceedings and the custody of children into the realm of EU law and 
the jurisdiction of the Court. See e.g. Case C-435/06 C (2007) ECR I-10141; Case C-68/07 Sundelind 
Lopez (2007) ECR I-10403: Case C-195/08 PPU Rinau (2008) ECR I-5271 and Case C-403/09 PPU 
Deticek (2009) ECR I-12193. A similar path was followed by the Rome Conventions on the 
determination of applicable law in matters of contractual and non-contractual obligations: The Rome I 
and II Regulations were adopted in 2007 and 2008 (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome 
II), (2007) OJ L199/40; Regulation No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), (2008) OJ L177/6. 
50 Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. The Lugano Convention is nearly identical to the Brussels Convention. It was 
entered into between the Member States of the EU and the states belonging to the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTEA) in 1988. 
51 For further information on the substantive content and normative implications of the Regulation, see 
e.g. Storskrubb 2008 p. 136-152. 
52 Article 293 TEC: Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other 
with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: 1) the protection of persons and the enjoyment 
and protection of rights under the same conditions as those accorded by each State to its own nationals, 2) 
the abolition of double taxation within the Community, 3) the mutual recognition of companies or firms 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal personality in the event of 
transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or 
firms governed by the laws of different countries, 4) the simplification of formalities governing the 
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards. 
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Nevertheless, some deficiensies were detected that needed attention. In December 1997 
the Council appointed a working group to examine the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions53 Simultaneously, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Convention 
to replace the Brussels Convention on the basis of Article K.3(2) of the TEU.54 In July 
1999 a new Commission proposal was published.55 The purpose was not to change the 
Convention in its entirety, but to make a few changes. After some additional proposals, 
the Regulation was passed and officially entered into force in 2002. Eight years later, 
the Commission again examined the practical function of the Regulation and 
contemplated necessary changes to the instrument.56 
 
2.1.1 ‘Arbitration exclusion’ in the Brussels I Regulation 
 
The exclusion of arbitration from the scope of Regulation was not specifically discussed 
in the preparatory reports. The Jenard report57 on the Brussels Convention, which 
contained the same wording in regard to the exclusion of arbitration, presented two 
reasons for the exclusion: the existence of many international agreements on arbitration 
and the preparation of a European Convention providing the uniform law on 
arbitration.58 The Schlosser report59 referred in its reasoning for the exclusion to the fact 
that all Member States have signed the 1958 New York Convention60. The Schlosser 
report also noted the difficulties where national courts take decisions on the subject 
matter of a dispute despite an arbitration agreement but does not decide between the two 
                                                
53 Storskrubb 2008, p. 132. 
54 COM (1997) 609, p. 20. 
55 COM (1999) 348, p.1. This proposal was however protracted at this stage. 
56 COM (2010) 748 p. 3. 
57 Jenard, P., Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, 5 March 1979, OJ C 59. 
58 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 21 April 1961. 
59 Schlosser, P, Report on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol of its 
Interpretation by the Court of Justice of 5 March 1979, OJ No C 59. 
60 The text of the New York Convention is available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (last visited 9 February 
2014) 
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options.61 
 
The scope of the arbitration exception has been controversial since the accession of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland to the Brussels Convention, and it has been a matter of 
dispute between common and civil law whether the arbitration exclusion should be 
interpreted broadly or narrowly. The Schlosser Report included a statement that 
 
 ‘[t]wo o divergent basic positions which it was not possible to reconcile 
 emerged from the discussion on the interpretation of the relevant  provisions of 
 Article 1, second paragraph point (4). The point of view expressed principally 
 on behalf of the United Kingdom was that this provision covers all disputes, 
 which the parties had effectively agreed to be settled by arbitration, including 
 any secondary disputes connected with the agreed arbitration. The other point 
 of view, defended by the original Member States of the EEC, only regards 
 proceedings before national courts as part of ‘arbitration’ if they refer to 
 arbitration proceedings, whether concluded, in progress or to be started’.62 
 
The common law approach seems to be that the provision should appliy to all disputes 
that the parties have agreed should be settled by arbitration, including any secondary 
disputes before a national court connected with the agreed arbitration, when the civil 
law approach is that the scope should depend on the substantive subject matter of the 
dispute.63 
 
Admittedly, it is noteworthy that by challenging an arbitration agreement before a court, 
a party may effectively undercut the arbitration agreement and create a situation of 
inefficient parallel court proceedings, which may lead to clashing resolutions of the 
dispute. This effect has to some commentators appeared paradoxal, since a court’s right 
to examine the validity of an arbitration agreement will probably lead to additional costs 
and delays, and the whole purpose of having chosen arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism in the first place.64 It may also undermine the predictability of the dispute 
resolution and spur abusive litigation tactics.65 However, this is a global phenomenon, 
and does not constitute and EU-specific issue. 
                                                
61 Schlosser report OJ 1979, C 59, 71, para. 62. 
62 Ibid, p. 92 
63 Ibid, para. 61. 
64 See Koulu 2007, p. 295. 
65 The Commission’s Proposal COM (2010) 748, p. 4. 
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Due to the arbitration exclusion, the parties to supranational arbitration are referred to 
other rules of arbitration, the New York Convention for instance. Even though the 
arbitration exclusion seemingly leaves little room for interpretation, the Court has 
intervened and declared the Regulation applicable on arbitration proceedings in certain 
circumstances.66 This in its turn has led to rather confused reactions among arbitration 
stakeholder, and the Court’s rulings have received strong criticism. The need for a 
revision of the Regulation became perceptible after the Court’s judgment in West 
Tankers in 2009, in which the Court did follow its own guidelines from earlier case law, 
but, due to the fear at the time of the EU becoming an unattractive centre for arbitration 
because of the influence of EU law, still caused commotion among commentators. 
 
2.1.2 Arbitration case law 
 
In this context three central judgments of the Court are examined, namely cases Marc 
Rich67, Van Uden68 and West Tankers69. All three cases have carved the way for 
arbitration development in the EU. Marc Rich and Van Uden were issued under the 
Brussels Convention, while West Tankers followed several years later, under the 
Regulation. 
 
The rationale behind the arbitration exclusion was explained in the Jenard Report by a 
group of experts set up in connection with the drafting of the Convention, which 
referred to the existence of many international agreements on arbitration.70 In other 
words, it did not seem appropriate to include arbitration in the scope of the Brussels 
Convention (and, later, of the Regulation) because arbitration was already governed by 
international arbitration conventions. The justification underlying the arbitration 
exclusion was recalled by the Court when it was first asked to clarify the scope of the 
exception in Marc Rich, in which the Court specifically referred to the appointment of 
                                                
66 Compare Dicey, para no. 15-003, in Collins 2002 p. 180. 
67 Case C-190/89 Marc Rich and Co. AG v Società Italiana Impianti PA (1991) ECR I-3855. 
68 Case C-391/95 Van Uden v Deco-Line (1998) ECR I-07091. 
69 Case 185/07 Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc. (2009) ECR I-
663. 
70 Jenard Report OJ 1979 No C/59 1, p. 13. 
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an arbitrator by a national court, which it qualified as part of the process of setting 
arbitration proceedings in motion, therefore concluding that such a measure was 
covered by the arbitration exclusion.71 
 
In Van Uden, the Court ruled that a national court on the basis of Article 24 of the 
Convention (currently Article 31 of the Regulation) could order provisional measures in 
support of arbitration, since provisional measures do not concern arbitration as such, but 
the protection of a wide variety of rights, and consequently their place in the scope of 
the Convention is determined not by their own nature, but by the nature of the rights 
which they serve to protect.  
 
In the 2009 West Tankers case, the Court decided on the one hand that proceedings 
which lead to the making of an anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration cannot come 
within the scope of the Regulation, but on the other hand it asserted that they may 
nevertheless have consequences which undermine the Regulation's effectiveness (in 
particular, where such proceedings prevent a court of another Member State from 
exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Regulation) and therefore stated their 
incompatibility with the Regulation.72 
 
At this point a brief presentation of the cases is sufficient enough. The case law is 
presented more scrupulously below, in Chapters 3 and 5. Before that a presentation of 
the role of the Court and international arbitration conventions is provided in order to 
present a bigger picture of the general development. 
 
2.2 The role of the Court as guardian of EU law 
This section includes a presentation of the central legislation that regulates the actions 
of the Court and the role of the Court when it comes to interpretation and legislative 
power. One of the most important features of the Court’s case law is that its judgements 
constitute final decisions on the interpretation of EU law rules.73 The Court is thus 
                                                
71 Draetta & Santini 2009, p. 741-742. 
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responsible for weighing central principles against each other and rendering clarifying 
judgments concerning for instance objects of legal protection and the purpose of a 
certain norm.  
 
The Court exercises jurisdiction in the EU. It strives to ensure that EU law is applied in 
a consistent way and that the organs of the EU do not exceed their jurisdiction. The 
Court has with its own interpretive actions been able to emphasise in particular the 
internal legal effects of EU law, especially through Article 267 TFEU and the system of 
preliminary rulings.74 Simultaneously, it has increased its own influence in relation to 
the courts of the Member States.75 
 
In performing both its role as the guardian and the vanguard of EU law, the Court has 
been directed as well as empowered by a provision which started as Article 164 EEC 
and now is Article 19(1) TEU – calling upon it to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed’.76 This was to be a relatively constrained 
mandate to check the abuse of powers and to provide judicial protection to those 
wronged by the legislative or administrative excesses in the EU legal arena.77 
 
Through its preliminary rulings, the Court has historically seeked to establish legal EU 
principles to fortify the function of the common market, and to promote the 
advancement of a political union and EU citizenship.78 The interpretation given in the 
rulings not only binds the referring court and the appellate court in the same proceeding 
but also carries a factual binding power on any other national court.79 In the 1970’s the 
main reason for the Court’s judicial activism was to tear down import restrictions 
between the Member States and hence to stimulate free trade in the community.80 
                                                                                                                                          
Case Law on the Development and Formation of European Private Law, in Moccia 2013, p. 78. 
74 The Court gives rulings in accordance with Article 19(3) TFEU. 
75 See e.g. C-6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) ECR 585 (primacy of EU law) or C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
(1963) ECR I (direct effect). 
76 A central task of the Court is giving preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of EU law and 
the validity of statutes given by the EU organs by request of the national courts. See Raitio 2013, p. 169. 
77 Accetto, M. The Past and Possible Future of European Union Judicature, in Bělohlávek & Rozehnalová 
2011, p. 4. 
78 Raitio 2013, p. 31. 
79 See Case C-66/80 International Chemical Corporation (1981) ECR 1191, para. 13. 
80 See C-8/74 Dassonville (1974) ECR 837 and C-120/78 Rewe-Central (1979) ECR 649 (Cassis de 
Dijon). 
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The principle of judicial non-interference in international arbitral proceedings is a 
central pillar of contemporary international arbitration.81 That said it is understandable 
why the application of the Regulation on arbitration proceedings can be aggravating to 
arbitration stakeholders counting on e.g. the precedence of international arbitration 
conventions. The principle is fundamentally important to the efficacy of the 
international arbitral process, ensuring that arbitration can proceed, pursuant to the 
agreement of the parties or under the direction of the tribunal, without the delays, 
second-guessings, and other problems associated with interlocutory judicial review of 
procedural decisions.82 
 
2.3 International arbitration: the New York Convention 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 
1958, the so-called New York Convention, has been fundamental to all the 
developments of UNCITRAL in modern arbitration law.83 Although the main purpose 
of the New York Convention is the enforcement of awards, it also deals with 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
 
The New York Convention was entered into due to the recognition of the growing 
importance of international arbitration as a means of settling international commercial 
disputes. It provides common legislative standards for the enforcement of foreign and 
arbitral awards. The Convention’s principal aim is that foreign arbitral awards are not 
discriminated against and it obliges convention member states to ensure that such 
awards are recognised and generally capable of enforcement in their jurisdiction in the 
same way as domestic awards. 
 
The New York Convention is considered the driving force behind modern international 
arbitration 84 , and has been perceived as a bold innovation, perhaps due to its 
                                                
81 Born 2009, p. 1033. 
82 Born 2009, p. 1000. 
83 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. See Lew, Julian D. M. Anti-Suit 
Injunctions Issued by National Courts. To Prevent Arbitration Proceedings, in Gaillard 2005, p. 
84 Born 2009, p. 1000. 
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overwhelming success.85 However, it has also been considered a logical follow-up to 
the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. Among 
the main ideas behind the New York Convention was 1) the elimination of the double 
exequatur, i.e. requiring an exequatur only in the country where enforcement of the 
award is sought, 2) to restrict the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement 
and 3) to switch the burden of proof of the existence of one or more of these grounds to 
the party against whom the enforcement was sought. As such, it appears that many of 
the ideas are similar to the ones later implemented in the European context for civil and 
commercial judgments in the Brussels Convention.86 
 
One of the most fundamental characteristics of international commercial arbitration is 
the parties' freedom to agree upon the arbitral procedure. This principle is 
acknowledged in the New York Convention and other major international arbitration 
conventions.87 Arbitration statutes guarantee the principle in virtually all developed 
jurisdictions and it is included in and facilitated by the rules of most leading arbitral 
institutions. The principle of the parties' procedural autonomy is qualified only by the 
mandatory requirements of applicable national law and, under most developed 
arbitration statutes, even these requirements are ordinarily limited in scope.88 
 
Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention permits non-recognition of an arbitral 
award if ‘[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.’89 
 
Article V(1)(d) is important because it recognises the parties' autonomy to agree upon 
the arbitral proceedings, including proceedings different from those prescribed by the 
laws of the arbitral seat. I.e. where the parties have made such an agreement, Article 
V(1)(d) requires, in effect, that their agreement be followed, notwithstanding contrary 
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87 See e.g. Article V the New York Convention. 
88 Born 2009, p. 1004. 
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procedural rules in the seat of the arbitration.90 
 
Essential to the arbitral process is the freedom of parties, and arbitrators, to proceed 
with their chosen dispute resolution mechanism to a final award, which only then may 
be subject to judicial review. The existence of interlocutory challenges or appeals from 
arbitrators' procedural decisions would have deeply damaging consequences for the 
arbitral process. To prevent these consequences, both the New York Convention and 
other international arbitration conventions and national arbitration statutes either 
expressly or implicitly adopt a principle of judicial non-interference in international 
arbitral proceedings. Although seldom remarked upon, this principle plays a central role 
in ensuring the efficacy of the arbitral process as a means of international dispute 
resolution.91 
 
At the European level, there is no uniform application of the New York Convention, 
because each Member State interprets its rules independently.92 On the one hand, this 
has created a strong competition among the different legal systems, which has fostered 
the progress of arbitration. On the other hand, such a situation gives rise to some 
inconsistencies in the functioning of the system, such as parallel proceedings with 
conflicting decisions, which undermine the certainty and the stability of commercial 
relations on the EU Internal Market.93 
 
Based on the preparatory work of the Brussels Convention and the Regulation, the New 
York Convention should be applied on arbitration proceedings. Under Article II of the 
New York Convention, there is an obligation on all States that are party to that 
Convention to stay court proceedings in favour of arbitration.94 This provision seems to 
suggest that if there is a valid arbitration clause, the courts should not be issuing 
injunctions to stop arbitration. The only qualification to this is that they should not 
interfere unless the arbitration agreement is ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed’. The fundamental rule therefore is that unless there is no arbitration 
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agreement, or the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed, national courts should not interfere with the arbitral process, a big 
subject in itself. 
 
It has been questioned whether international arbitration is becoming a victim of its own 
success. International commercial arbitration has increased drastically over the last 40 
years, and has thus become the primary method of settling trade disputes.95 The New 
York Convention has also received some critique due to its large amount of members 
and the difficulties that follows when trying to maintain a unifying code that serves the 
interests and different legal systems of all 149 members states of the New York 
Convention.96 
 
 
3 EXCLUDING ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE – THE 
BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted above, the scope of the arbitration exclusion has been the subject of debate 
since the Brussels Convention came into force. The main issues disputed relate to 
ancillary proceedings, provisional measures and parallel proceedings. The Court has 
rendered three indicative decisions dealing with these issues. However, they did not 
succeed in delivering all the necessary answers as to the applicability of the Regulation 
and to the competence of national courts concerning arbitration or matters relating to 
arbitration. 
 
                                                
95 Panico, R. C. Reform of the Brussels I-Regulation: the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, in Ferrari & Kröll 2012, 
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3.2 A look at significant case law of the Court 
The interpretation of the arbitration exception has been on the Court’s agenda in a 
handful of cases. The questions have mainly concerned the interface between arbitration 
and the Regulation. The Court has ever since the arbitration exclusion was first 
formulated upheld a consistent line of preliminary ruling in accordance with the 
principle of mutual trust in the EU. 
 
3.2.1 Marc Rich – ancillary proceedings 
 
One of the first cases where the Court issued a preliminary ruling in a matter relating to 
the interface between arbitration and court proceedings was in Case C-190/89 Marc 
Rich and Co. AG v Società Italiana Impianti PA (1991) ECR I-3855 (‘March Rich’). 
The case dealt with ancillary proceedings to arbitration and the ruling was given based 
on the Brussels Convention.  Ancillary proceedings are legal proceedings that do not 
constitute the primary dispute but which aid the judgment rendered in or the outcome of 
the main action.97 
 
In 1989, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales referred three questions on the 
interpretation of certain provisions of the Brussels Convention to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation by the Court of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention.98 
 
The questions were raised in proceedings between Marc Rich and Co. AH and Società 
Italiana Impianta PA (Marc Rich and Impianta). In the case, Marc Rich made an offer to 
purchase a quantity of Iranian crude oil on fob terms from Impianti. Impianti accepted 
the offer subject to certain further conditions. Marc Rich confirmed acceptance of those 
further conditions and sent a further message setting out the terms of the contract and 
including a clause on arbitration. Marc Rich, however, complained that the cargo was 
                                                
97 See Illmer 2011, p. 649. 
98 Case C-190/89 Marc Rich, para. 1. 
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seriously contaminated, causing it to incur a loss en excess of USD 7 000 000.99 
 
Impianti then summoned Marc Rich to appear before the Tribunale, which is the 
Regional Court in Genoa, Italy, in an action for a declaration that it was not liable to 
Marc Rich. Marc Rich, relying on the existence of the arbitration clause, then lodged 
submissions to the effect that the Italian court had no jurisdiction. Later on, Marc Rich 
commenced arbitration proceedings in London, in which Impianti refused to take part. 
Consequently, Marc Rich commenced proceedings before the High Court of Justice in 
London for the appointment of an arbitrator based om section 10(3) of the Arbitration 
Act 1950. As a result, the High Court granted leave to serve an originating summons on 
Impianti in Italy.100 
 
Impianti requested that the order granting leave be set aside, contending that the real 
dispute between the parties was linked to the question whether or not the contract in 
question contained an arbitration clause. It considered that such a dispute fell within the 
scope of the Brussels Convention, and should therefore be resolved in Italy. Marc Rich, 
on the other hand, took the view that the dispute fell outside the scope of the Brussels 
Convention by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention. The High Court later held that the 
Brussels Convention was not applicable in the matter.101 
 
The Court of Appeal then decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions 
to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 1) Does the exception in Article 1(4) of the 
Convention extend to any litigation or judgments and, if so, to litigation or judgments 
where the initial existence of an arbitration agreement is in issue. 2) If the present 
dispute falls within the Convention and not within the exception to the Convention, 
whether the buyers can nevertheless establish jurisdiction in England pursuant to Article 
5(1) of the Convention and/or Article 17 of the Convention, and 3) if the buyers are 
otherwise able to establish jurisdiction in England than under para. 2 above, whether the 
Court must decline jurisdiction or should stay its proceedings under Article 21 of the 
Conventions or, alternatively whether the Court should stay its proceedings under 
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Article 22, of the Convention, on the grounds that the Italian court was first seised.102 
 
In its judgment, the Court ruled that in order to determine whether a dispute falls within 
the scope of the Brussels Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject 
matter of the dispute.103 If, by virtue of its subject matter, such as the appointment of an 
arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of a 
preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, 
whatever that issue may be, justify application of the Convention. 
 
In the case before the Court, it followed that the fact that a preliminary issue relates to 
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement does not affect the exclusion from 
the scope of the Brussels Convention of a dispute concerning the appointment of an 
arbitrator.104 
 
Impianti considered that the arbitration exclusion in Article 1(4) of the Brussels 
Convention does not apply to proceedings before national courts or to decisions given 
by them. It contended that ‘arbitration’ in the strict sense concerns proceedings before 
private individuals on whom the parties have conferred the authority to settle the dispute 
between them. Impianti bases that view essentially on the purpose of Article 220 of the 
Treaty, which, it argues, is to establish a complete system for the free movement of 
decisions determining a dispute. Consequently, it is legitimate to interpret Article 1(4) 
of the Convention in such a way as to avoid gaps in the legal system for ensuring the 
free movement of decisions terminating a dispute.105 
 
Marc Rich and the governments supported a broad interpretation106 of the concept of 
arbitration, which would completely exclude any disputes relating to the appointment of 
an arbitrator from the scope of the Brussels Convention.107 With respect to the exclusion 
of arbitration from the scope of the Brussels Convention, the report by the group of 
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experts set up in connection with the drafting of the Convention108 explained that there 
are already many international agreements on arbitration. Arbitration is referred to in 
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. This, and the fact that the New York Convention and 
other international arbitration conventions work sufficiently, is why it seemed 
preferable to exclude arbitration. 
 
More particularly, it must be pointed out that the appointment of an arbitrator by a 
national court is a measure adopted by the Member State as part of the process of 
setting arbitration proceedings in motion. Such a measure therefore comes within the 
sphere of arbitration and is thus covered by the exclusion contained in Article 1(4) of 
the Convention.109 
 
In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the Brussels 
Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject matter of the dispute (author’s 
emphasis).110 If, by virtue of its subject matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, 
a dispute falls outside the scope of the Brussels Convention, the existence of a 
preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, 
whatever that issue may be, justify application of the Convention.111 
 
It would also be contrary to principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives 
pursued by the Convention for the applicability of the exclusion laid down in Article 
1(4) of the Brussels Convention to vary according to the existence or otherwise of a 
preliminary issue, which the parties basically might raise at any time.112 
 
It follows that, in the case before the Court, the fact that a preliminary issue relates to 
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement does not affect the exclusion from 
the scope of the Convention of a dispute concerning the appointment of an arbitrator.113 
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Consequently, the outcome in Marc Rich must be that Article 1(4) of the Brussels 
Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion provided for therein 
extends to litigation pending before a national court concerning the appointment of an 
arbitrator, even if the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement is a preliminary 
issue in that litigation.114 In other words, the interpretation of the exclusion in Marc 
Rich was broad. 
 
3.2.2 Van Uden – interim measures 
 
The judgment in Case C-391/95 Van Uden v Deco-Line (1998) ECR I-07091 (Van 
Uden) shed light on a certain area of the Brussels Convention. It was held by the Court 
that interim measures115 ordered in support of arbitration proceedings could in some 
cases be covered by the Convention.116 
 
In 1995, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands referred eight questions on the 
interpretation of Article 1(2)(d), Article 3, Article 5(1) and Article 24 of the Brussels 
Convention. 
 
In 1993 Van Uden and Deco-Line concluded a ‘slot/space charter agreement’, under 
which Van Uden undertook to make available cargo space on board vessels operated by 
Van Uden to Deco-Line. In return, Deco-Line was to pay charter hire in accordance 
with the rates agreed between the parties. 117  Van Uden constituted arbitration 
proceedings in the Netherlands pursuant to the agreement, on the ground that Deco-Line 
                                                
114 Bogdan 1996, p. 296. 
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had failed to pay certain invoices submitted to it by Van Uden.118 Van Uden also 
applied to the District Court of Rotterdam for interim relief because Deco-Line was not 
displaying the necessary diligence in the appointment of arbitrators and that non-
payment of its invoices was disturbing its cash flow. In its application, it sought an 
order against Deco-Line for payment to cover debts due under the agreement. In those 
proceedings, Deco-Line objected, first, that the Netherlands court had no jurisdiction to 
entertain the claims. Established in Germany, it could be sued only before the German 
courts. The President of District Court dismissed that objection on the ground that an 
order sought as interim relief must be regarded as a provisional measure within the 
meaning of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention.119 Referring to Article 126(3) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, he decided that, as court of the plaintiff's domicile, he had 
jurisdiction to entertain an application made by a plaintiff residing in the Netherlands 
against a defendant with no known domicile or recognised place of residence there. He 
further concluded that the case had the requisite minimum connection with Netherlands 
law. The President of the Rechtbank took the view that his jurisdiction was in no way 
affected by the fact that the parties had agreed to have their dispute determined by 
arbitration in the Netherlands since, under Article 1022(2) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, an arbitration clause cannot preclude a party's right to seek interim relief.120 
By judgment of 21 June 1994, the President of the District Court therefore ordered 
Deco-Line to pay Van Uden a sum together with interest at the statutory rate. 
 
On appeal by Deco-Line, the Regional Court of Appeal of The Hague nullified that 
order. In its view, the fact that the case had to have a sufficient connection with 
Netherlands law meant, in the context of the Convention, that it must be possible for the 
interim order applied for to be enforced in the Netherlands. The mere fact that Deco-
Line could acquire assets there in the future was, it considered, insufficient for that 
purpose.121 
 
A further appeal against that decision was brought before the Supreme Court of the 
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Netherlands, which stayed proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling by the Court 
on eight questions.122 The questions raised related to the jurisdiction, under the Brussels 
Conventions, of a court hearing application for interim relief. The questions both dealt 
with whether such jurisdiction could be established based on Article 5(1) of the Brussels 
Convention and whether it could be established based on Article 24. In both cases, the 
national court’s questions relate to the relevance of the fact that the dispute in question 
is subject to arbitration. The questions concerned whether the jurisdiction of the court 
hearing the application for interim relief is subject to the condition that the measure 
sought must take the effect or be capable of taking effect in the State of that court, in 
particular that it must be enforceable there, and whether it is necessary that such a 
condition should be met at the time when the application is made. Finally, the national 
court’s questions relate to the relevance of the fact that the case relates to a claim for 
interim payment of a contractual consideration.123 
 
The Court ruled that under Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Convention, arbitration is 
excluded from its scope. By that provision, the Contracting Parties to the Convention 
intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety124, including proceedings brought before 
national courts.125 
 
The experts' report drawn up on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention126 
specifies that the Brussels Convention does not apply to judgments determining whether 
an arbitration agreement is valid or not. In case it is considered invalid, the Convention 
does no apply to judgments ordering the parties not to continue the arbitration 
proceedings, or to proceedings and decisions concerning applications for the revocation, 
amendment, recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards. Also excluded from the 
scope of the Brussels Convention are proceedings ancillary to arbitration proceedings, 
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such as the appointment or dismissal of arbitrators, the fixing of the place of arbitration 
or the extension of the time limit for making awards. 
 
However, if the subject matter of court proceedings are measures not ancillary but rather 
parallel to arbitration proceedings, the Brussels Convention remains applicable if the 
subject matter of the parallel proceedings falls within its the scope of application. 
 
However, it must be noted in that regard that interim measures are not in principle 
ancillary to arbitration proceedings but are ordered in parallel to such proceedings and 
are intended as measures of support.127 They concern not arbitration as such but the 
protection of a wide variety of rights. Their place in the scope of the Brussels 
Convention is thus determined not by their own nature but by the nature of the rights 
which they serve to protect.128 
 
The Court therefore concluded that where the subject matter of an application for 
interim measures relates to a question falling within the scope ratione materiae of the 
Brussels Convention, the Convention is applicable and Article 24 thereof may confer 
jurisdiction on the court hearing that application even where proceedings have already 
been, or may be, commenced on the substance of the case and even where those 
proceedings are to be conducted before arbitrators.129 
 
Court proceedings parallel and not ancillary to arbitration proceedings thus fall into the 
scope of the Brussels Convention even if a valid arbitration agreement exists which 
overthrows the jurisdiction of the Member States’ courts for the main proceedings. The 
fact that a preliminary issue relates to the existence or validity of an arbitration 
agreement does not affect the exclusion from the scope of the Brussels Convention. The 
interim measures in the case served to protect arbitration proceedings, and thus the 
arbitration exclusion becomes applicable. 
 
Thus, where the proceedings in a national court are principally for the purpose of 
                                                
127 C-391/95 Van Uden, para. 33. 
128 See Case C-261/90 Reichert and Kockler v Dresdner Bank [1992] ECR I-2149, para 32. 
129 C-391/95 Van Uden, para. 34. 
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appointing or removing an arbitrator, fixing the place of the arbitration, enforcing or 
setting aside an arbitral award, or answering some point of law raised in an arbitration 
then those proceedings fall outside the Regulation. The less clear cases include e.g. 
proceedings where the validity of the arbitration is the principal issue, proceedings in 
which the arbitration agreement is used to challenge jurisdiction, injunctive proceedings 
to enforce an arbitration agreement, and declaratory proceedings as to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. The English view seems to be that the scope of application of the 
arbitration exclusion should be wide in order to include all these cases would fall 
outside the scope of the Regulation.130 
 
3.2.3 West Tankers – parallel proceedings 
 
The deficiency of the interface between the Regulation and arbitration hit its peak in 
Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA, formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtá SpA and Generali 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc (2009) ECR I-663 (West Tankers). In 
the case the Court ruled that such countermeasures to parallel proceedings as anti-suit 
injunctions do not comply with provisions of the Regulation, thus, leaving, accordning 
to some commentators, no room for effective mechanisms to avoid parallel 
proceedings.131 
 
In 2000, the Front Comor, a vessel owned by West Tankers and chartered by Erg Petroli 
SpA (Erg), collided and caused damage in Syracuse, Italy, with a jetty owned by Erg. 
The charterparty was governed by English law and contained a clause providing for 
arbitration in London, United Kingdom. Erg claimed compensation from its insurers 
Allianz and Generali up to the limit of its insurance cover and commenced arbitration 
proceedings in London against West Tankers for the excess. West Tankers denied 
liability for the damage caused by the collision.132 
 
Having paid Erg compensation under the insurance policies for the loss it had suffered, 
Allianz and Generali brought proceedings against West Tankers before the Tribunale di 
                                                
130 Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p. 64. 
131 On parallel proceedings and anti-suit injunctions, see e.g. Illmer 2011, p. 650-651. 
132 C-185/07 West Tankers, paras 9-10. 
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Siracusa, Italy, in order to recover the sums they had paid to Erg. The action was based 
on their statutory right of subrogation to Erg’s claims, in accordance with Article 1916 
of the Italian Civil Code. West Tankers raised an objection of lack of jurisdiction 
because of the existence of the arbitration agreement.133 
 
In parallel, West Tankers brought proceedings before the High Court of Justice of 
England and Wales, Queens Bench Division (the Commercial Court), seeking a 
declaration that the dispute between itself, on the one hand, and Allianz and Generali, 
on the other, was to be settled by arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement. West 
Tankers also sought an injunction restraining Allianz and Generali from pursuing any 
proceedings other than arbitration and requiring them to discontinue the proceedings 
commenced before the Tribunale di Siracusa (‘the anti-suit injunction’).134 
 
The Commercial Court upheld West Tankers’ claims and granted the anti-suit 
injunction sought against Allianz and Generali. The latter appealed against that 
judgment to the House of Lords. They argued that the grant of such an injunction is 
contrary to the Regulation. The House of Lords first referred to the judgments in 
Gasser135 and Turner136, which decided in substance that an injunction restraining a 
party from commencing or continuing proceedings in a court of a Member State cannot 
be compatible with the system established by the Regulation, even where it is granted 
by the court having jurisdiction under that regulation. That is because the Regulation 
provides a complete set of uniform rules on the allocation of jurisdiction between the 
courts of the Member States, which must trust each other to apply those rules 
correctly.137 
 
However, in the view of the House of Lords, that principle cannot be extended to 
arbitration, which is completely excluded from the scope of the Regulation based on 
Article 1(2)(d). In that field, there is no set of uniform EC rules, which is a necessary 
                                                
133 Ibid, para. 11. 
134 Ibid, para. 12. 
135 Case C-116/02 Gasser (2003) ECR I-14693. 
136 Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit (2004) ECR I‑3565. In the case the Court held that granting an 
injunction restraining foreign proceedings before a court of another Member State on the ground of abuse 
of process was inconsistent with the Brussels Convention. 
137 Case C-185/07 West Tankers, paras 13-14. 
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condition in order that mutual trust between the courts of the Member States may be 
established and applied. Moreover, it was considered clear from the judgment in Marc 
Rich138 that the exclusion in Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation applies not only to 
arbitration proceedings as such, but also to legal proceedings the subject matter of 
which is arbitration. 
 
The judgment in Van Uden139 stated that arbitration is the subject matter of proceedings 
serving to protect the right to determine the dispute by arbitration, which was the case in 
the main proceedings. The House of Lords added that since all arbitration matters fall 
outside the scope of the Regulation, an injunction addressed to Allianz and Generali 
restraining them from having recourse to proceedings other than arbitration and from 
continuing proceedings before the Tribunale di Siracusa cannot infringe the 
Regulation.140 
 
Finally, the House of Lords pointed out that the courts of the United Kingdom have for 
many years used anti-suit injunctions. That practice is, in its view, a valuable tool for 
the court of the seat of arbitration, exercising supervisory jurisdiction over the 
arbitration, as it promotes legal certainty and reduces the possibility of conflict between 
the arbitration award and the judgment of a national court. Furthermore, it pointed out 
that if the courts in other Member States also adopted the practice it would make the EC 
more competitive vis-à-vis international arbitration centres such as New York, Bermuda 
and Singapore.141 
 
In those circumstances, the House of Lords decided to stay its proceedings and to refer 
the matter to the Court for a preliminary ruling. The House of Lords asked the Court if 
it is consistent with the Regulation for a court of a Member State to issue an order to 
restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in another Member State 
on the ground that such proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement.142 
 
                                                
138 Case C-190/89 Marc Rich. 
139 Case C-391/95 Van Uden. 
140 Case C-185/07 West Tankers, paras 15-16. 
141 Ibid, para. 17. 
142 Ibid, para. 18. 
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Before this debated decision, the Court was already dealing with the respective problem 
or at least with the interconnected issues in Marc Rich, Van Uden and Mostaza Claro143. 
In West Tankers Inc.144, the parties had agreed upon an express arbitration clause, 
whereby London was to be the seat of arbitration, and therefore subject to English law. 
Despite this arbitration clause, the Court held that the English court’s grant of an anti-
suit injunction to uphold the arbitration agreement was incompatible and inconsistent 
with the Regulation. 
 
The Court reasoned that allowing the English court to grant an anti-suit injunction 
directly stripped other Member State courts of the ability to examine their own 
jurisdiction’s questions pursuant to the Regulation, thereby violating the mutual trust 
among EU Member States.145 The Court thus appears to have adopted the civil law 
view of an anti-suit injunction, finding an anti-suit injunction as directly interfering with 
foreign jurisdictions and the principle of international comity.146 
 
The Court also stated that an anti-suit injunction that stops another Member State court 
from taking legal proceedings regarding the validity or applicability of an arbitration 
agreement means that a party by referring to the arbitration agreement deprives the 
possibility of the other party to plead the case in the court where (s)he brought action in 
accordance with the Regulation. This would in practice mean that the counterparty was 
deprived of a form of court protection (s)he has the right to.147 The Court thus ruled that 
anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the Regulation.148 
 
The Court’s ruling in West Tankers was not surprising as such, since it corresponded to 
its earlier case law.149 The Court has been rather clear on the matter that the division of 
competence between the Member State courts is directly based on the Regulation. Each 
court where legal proceedings have been taken has the right to examine its competence 
                                                
143 Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL (2006) ECR I-1042 (consumer protection 
and arbitration). 
144 See supra note 69. 
145 Case C-185/07 West Tankers, para. 29. 
146 Kim 2011, p. 574; Case C-185/07 West Tankers, para. 30. 
147 Ibid, para. 31. 
148 Ibid, para. 34. 
149 See also the Court’s ruling in cases C-116/02 Eric Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl (2003) ECR I-1469 and 
C-159/02 Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd., Changepoint SA. ECR I-3578. 
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in the matter. Consequently, a court in another Member State is never considered to 
have stronger jurisdiction in the matter of deciding whether the first-mentioned court is 
competent or not.150 An anti-suit injunction issued by a Member State court towards 
another Member State court therefore intrudes on the competence division between the 
Member State courts in a way that is unacceptable according to EU law. 
 
Taking into consideration that the question of interpretation in West Tankers concerned 
the anti-suit injunction, which has little or no value outside of England151, the critique 
may seem surprising.152 The critique has however foremost been directed against the 
way in which the Court has been considered to have watered out the arbitration 
exclusion. The fear after the judgment in West Tankers was that the result would be that 
international arbitration with seat in the EU would be avoided in favour of seats outside 
the EU, e.g. Zürich, New York or Singapore.153 However, in retrospect the fear was 
uncalled for. 
 
Blaming the Court for having left arbitration agreements within the EU vulnerable for 
attack would be wrong. As a matter of law, its decision in West Tankers, as 
unsatisfactory as the result may have been for some, was justified. For the reasons given 
by the Court, anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the Regulation. The problem at 
the heart of the matter is parallel proceedings in relation to the validity of an arbitration 
agreement. It was not for the Court to predetermine this reform in one way or another. 
Hence, the Court’s decision in West Tankers was an expression of judicial self-restraint 
rather than stepping out of its area of competence.154 
 
                                                
150 See case C-116/02 Gasser, para. 48 and case C-159/02 Turner, para. 26. 
151 Anti-Suit Injunctions originated in common law jurisdictions. English courts, for example, started to 
grant these discretionary remedies two centuries ago. See Lew, Julian D.M. Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued 
by National Courts. To Prevent Arbitration Proceedings, in Gaillard 2005, p. 25. 
152 Knuts 2011, p. 498. 
153 Knuts 2011, p. 497-498. See also Wilson, Maura E. Let Go of That Case! British Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Against Brussels Convention Members. Cornell Int’l Law Journal Vol. 36, 2003, p. 207-226. 
154 Illmer 2011, p. 655. 
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3.3 General outlines of the Court concerning the application of the 
Regulation in arbitration proceedings 
To summarise the outlines of the Court’s rulings in matters concerning arbitration we 
can observe a rather consistent interpretive positioning in the cases presented above. 
Essentially, it is a question about the subject matter of the case, and the question of 
whether there is a real connecting link between the subject matter of the case and the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Member State of the court in which the case is pending, in 
other words, the competence of the court. 
 
What seems to emerge from the decisions in Van Uden and Marc Rich is that the 
exception in Article 1(2)(d) is to be limited to cases in which the subject matter of the 
case is arbitration. 155  An examination of West Tankers brings to the fore the 
fundamentally opposed views civil and common law jurisdictions hold of anti-suit 
injunctions in the context of international commercial arbitration.156 The outcome of 
West Tankers was however that anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the 
Regulation because of the potentially negative influence they have on the parties’ legal 
protection and the mutual trust between the Member States. 
 
 
4 REVISION OF THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
 
On 6 December 2012, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 
(EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters. The primary objective of adopting the Regulation was 
to facilitate the circulation of judgments and to further enhance access to justice within 
the EU. The revised Regulation will apply to legal proceedings instituted on or after 10 
                                                
155 Such as the appointment or dismissal of arbitrators, orders fixing the place of arbitration, judgments on 
the validity of arbitration agreements and corresponding orders not to continue arbitration proceedings, or 
proceedings concerning the revocation, amendment, recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
156 Rainer 2010, p. 434. 
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January 2015.157 The new Regulation introduces some key changes aiming to make the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments given by courts in Member States easier and 
more effective; however, contrary to the arbitration community’s expectations, the 
Regulation has not fully succeeded in clarifying the contentious interface between 
legislation and arbitration. 
 
4.1 Preparatory work 
In preparation of the new Regulation, the Commission consulted stakeholders and 
sought extensive external expertise on the matters discussed. It adopted a Green Paper 
launching a public consultation in April 2009 and commissioned four studies addressing 
different issues of the reform. Empirical data supporting the preparation of the impact 
assessment was collected, and the Commission also organised two major conferences, a 
meeting with national experts and two meetings with experts on arbitration. An inter-
service steering group within the Commission provided additional comments.158 
 
The revision did not change the arbitration exclusion and Article 1(2)(d) of the 
Regulation still simply declares that the Regulation will not apply to arbitration. The 
purpose of the Regulation is established as being the promotion of free circulation of 
judgments in the area of civil matters in the EU, in accordance with the principle of 
mutual trust and the guidelines in the Stockholm Programme.159 
 
In the next section follows a systematic run-through of the central preparatory work of 
the new Regulation. The preparatory work illustrates the interplay between the bodys of 
                                                
157 Article 66 of the new Regulation reads as follows: 1) This Regulation shall apply only to legal 
proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements 
approved or concluded on or after 10 January 2015. 2) Notwithstanding Article 80, Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 shall continue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted, to authentic 
instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded before 10 
January 2015 which fall within the scope of that Regulation. 
158 SEC (2010) 1548 final, section 1. 
159 In December 2009 the European Council adopted a legislative plan for 2010-2014 called ‘The 
Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’. The Stockholm 
Programme contains, inter alia, plans concerning the conclusion by the EU of international agreements in 
the field of private international law. OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p.1. See also the Council’s press release 
“Recast of the Brussels I regulation: towards easier and faster circulation of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters within the EU” (16599/12). 
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the EU, and also includes the opinions of arbitrations stakeholders and legal scholars of 
the Member States. Since the preparatory work encompasses the Regulation as a whole, 
only issues relating to the arbitration exception are presented. 
 
4.1.1 European Commission 
 
The Commisson prepares, enforces and supervises the obeyance of secondary 
legislation enacted by the European Parliament and the Council. The role of the 
Commission is remarkable especially regarding its power of initiative in EU legislation 
matters. The Commission is a fully independent organ of the EU, which pushes the 
EU’s general interests, and which cannot accept any instructions whatsoever from any 
Member State government. The Commission is an administrative body that is mainly 
responsible for for e.g. the realisation of collective policies. 160  The Commission 
declares that the new Regulation sets out rules determining the international jurisdiction 
of the courts of the Member States and rules preventing parallel proceedings before the 
courts of different Member States. It also lays down rules for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments of national courts in other Member States.161 
 
The Heidelberg report 
 
The Heidelberg report162 was published in 2008 by request of the Commission. The goal 
of the report was to compile a survey of the implementation of the Regulation in the 
Member States and to draw up proposals for its improvement. One of the main objects 
discussed was the question of the arbitration exclusion in the Regulation. 
 
The Heidelberg report is an empirical study based on interviews, statistics and practical 
research in the files of national courts. The main feedback was that the Regulation is 
widely appreciated. For instance, one interviewee stated, ‘[t] he Judgment Regulation is 
                                                
160 Raitio 2013, p. 118. 
161 COM (2013) 554 final, p. 2. 
162 Heidelberg report (Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States (Study 
JLS/C4/2005/03) was compiled by Burkhard Hess, Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser. 
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the best piece of legislation we’ve ever got from Brussels’.163 The report contains 
several improvement proposals, mainly to develop the general function of the 
Regulation as an instrument of European Procedural Law. 
 
In relation to arbitration, the Heidelberg report suggested a deletion of the arbitration 
exclusion completely, although most of the national reports were critical towards a 
possible extension of the Regulation to arbitration. The question of recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards should thereby be kept outside the scope of the 
Regulation, giving full effect to the New York Convention. However, the primacy of 
the New York Convention does not exclude provisions concerning interfaces between 
the Regulation and the Convention, such as the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement, ancillary measures, recognition and enforcement as well as conflicts 
between arbitral awards and judgments.164 
 
To tackle the problem of the possible existence of parallel proceedings and conflicting 
judgments the authors suggested including the following provision as a new Article 27A 
of the Regulation: 
 
 A court of a Member State shall stay the proceedings once the defendant 
 contests the jurisdiction of the court with respect to existence and scope of an 
 arbitration agreement if a court of the Member State that is designated as place 
 of arbitration in the arbitration agreement is seised for declaratory relief in 
 respect to the existence, the validity and/or the scope of that arbitration 
 agreement.165 
 
Historically the arbitration exclusion has been defined as referring to the functioning 
relationship between the Brussels Regime and the New York Convention. As follows 
from the Heidelberg report, the Regulation has nevertheless been considered to work 
quite well. The report introduced two improvement proposals: either to completely 
remove Article 1(2)(d) from the Regulation in order to maintain the priority of the New 
York Convention through Article 71 of the Regulation, or to tackle the interplay 
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between arbitration and the Regulation.166 The first alternative was presented as a 
proposal for a new Article 22(6) of the Regulation: 
 
 The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of 
 domicile, (...)  (6) in  ancillary proceedings concerned with the support of 
 arbitration the courts of the Member  State in which the arbitration takes 
 place.167 
 
In other words, the purpose of the article is to clarify that only the Member State court 
where the arbitration proceedings first took place has the competence to rule 
proceedings that support arbitration.168 This matter was touched upon in case Marc Rich 
(ancillary proceedings)169. 
 
The report also touched upon the question of parallel proceedings concerning the 
validity of an arbitration agreement in different Member States.170 It brought forth a 
need to decide that it should be obligatory to stay proceedings in order to avoid parallel 
proceedings. The proposal, sometimes called an anti-torpedo171, was included in the 
proposed Article 27A. 
 
According to the proposal, the court must stay proceedings in case the defendant 
questions the competence of the court. By deciding that courts in other Member States 
have to await ruling from the court of the seat of arbitration, it would be possible to 
avoid parallel procedures concerning the arbitration agreement.172 
 
The Heidelberg report also deals with the question of the seat of arbitration. A guideline 
was presented as follows: 
 
 The place of arbitration shall depend on the agreement of the parties or be 
 determined by the arbitral tribunal. Otherwise, the court of the Capital of  the 
 designated Member State shall be competent, lacking such a designation the 
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168 Knuts 2011, p. 499. 
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 court shall be competent that would have general jurisdiction over the dispute 
 under the Regulation if there was no arbitration agreement.173 
 
In other words the parties have to decide on where the seat of arbitration is situated, or 
decide that the seat of arbitration is situated in the Member State where the arbitration 
proceedings de facto takes place. In accordance with the case law of the Court, Article 
1(2)(d) of the Regulation is to be interpreted broadly.  
 
The Commission’s report on the application of the Regulation 
 
The Commission’s report174  to the European Parliament, the Council and to the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) concerning the application of the 
Regulation was prepared in accordance with Article 73 of the Regulation, and its 
purpose is to present an evaluation of the application of the Regulation in five years 
from the day that the Regulation has entered into force. A Green Paper that contained 
proposals on how some questions that had been presented in the report could be 
improved in the future followed the Report. Both the Report and the Green Paper were 
published in 2009. 
 
According to the report, the logical ground behind the arbitration exclusion is the New 
York Convention that regulates the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and arbitration awards.175 It is repeated in the Commission's report that the 
Regulation is considered to be a well functioning instrument, nevertheless with some 
deficiencies.176 
 
The Green Paper 
 
Based on the Heidelberg report the Commission published a Green Paper 177 
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177 Green Paper on the Review of the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
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accompanying the report. One of the main questions in the Green Paper concerned the 
disputed relationship between the Regulation and arbitration. 
 
 The report and the Green Paper indicated possibilities of a complete and partial deletion 
of the arbitration exclusion.178 About the problems concerning parallel proceedings the 
priority was suggested to be granted to the court at the seat of the arbitration to decide 
on the validity of an arbitration agreement, potentially supplemented by a time limit and 
a uniform conflict rule on the law applicable to the validity of arbitration agreements. In 
addition, the Commission suggested enhancing recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards across the EU supplementing the New York Convention.  
 
The significance of arbitration for international business life is touched upon in the 
Green Paper, in which it is stated that arbitration agreements should be given the 
strongest possible effect and that the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards 
should be encouraged.179 The importance of a smooth circulation of judgments in the 
EU and the prevention of parallel proceedings is specified to represent the main reason 
to regulate arbitraton, otherwise the New York Convention is considered to be a 
sufficient tool for arbitration practices. 
 
The Green Paper brings forth a proposal for a partial abolishment of the arbitration 
exclusion from the Regulation. The prognosis for such an abolishment is that court 
proceedings supporting arbitration may come within the scope of application of the 
Regulation, and that a special rule regulating the jurisdiction in such cases would 
increase legal protection. An abolishment would possibly also ensure that all rules in the 
jurisdiction of the Regulation would be applied on the issuing of precautionary 
measures in procedures that support arbitration (not just Article 31180). It was also stated 
                                                
178 Green Paper suggested that a (partial) deletion of the arbitration exclusion from the scope of the 
Regulation could improve its interface with court proceedings. See The Green Paper, p 9. 
179 Green Paper, p. 8. Regarding the arbitration exclusion a question (no 7) was asked in the Green Paper: 
‘Which action do you consider appropriate at Community level: 1) To strengthen the effectiveness of 
arbitration agreements; 2) To ensure a good coordination between judicial and arbitration proceedings; 
3) To enhance the effectiveness of arbitration awards?’ 
180 Article 31 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 reads ”Application may be made to the courts of a 
Member State for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of 
that State, even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter.” 
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that an abolishment of the exclusion possibly would allow for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments ruling on the validity of an arbitration agreement and 
clarifying the recognition and enforcement of judgments that are ancillary to an 
arbitration award, which in its turn would prevent parallel proceedings between courts 
and arbitration tribunals where the agreement is considered to be invalid in one Member 
State and valid in another.181 
 
The Green Paper also deals with the question of the division of labor between courts 
and arbitraton tribunals. The coordination between proceedings concerning the validity 
of an arbitration agreement is not clear. An alternative could be to prioritise the Member 
State courts where the seat of arbitration is situated, to decide on the existence, validity 
and scope of arbitration agreements. A unanimous rule of conflict is suggested to 
decrease the risk that the agreement is considered invalid in one Member State and valid 
in another. The rule of conflict could for instance be to provide information about which 
Member State's legislation will be applied on the agreement. 
 
An additional rule is proposed in the Green Paper. A rule that would give permission to 
refuse the recognition of a judgment that is incompatible with an arbitration agreement 
that has been recognised in accordance with the New York Convention. An alternative 
to this could be to award the court where the arbitration agreement was created 
exclusive competence to confirm the enforcement of the judgment as well as procedural 
fairness. Afterwards the judgment could circulate freely in the EU. A third alternative 
proposed the use of Article VII182 of the New York Convention to further simplify the 
recognition of arbitraton awards on EU level.183 
 
                                                
181 Green Paper, p. 9. 
182 Article VII 1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or 
bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the 
Contracting State nor deprive any interested party if any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral 
award by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be replied upon. 2. The 
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease to have effect between Contracting States on their becoming bound 
and to the extent that they become bound, by this Convention. 
183 Green Paper, p. 9; European Parliament Committee’s proposal concerning the position of arbitration in 
the EU clearly opts for arbitration. As soon as an arbitration clause is at stake, each EU state is freed from 
the jurisdictional constraints of the Regulation. See Hans van Houtte: European Parliament Committee 
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The Commission’s proposal 
 
In June 2010, the Commission finally appointed a group of experts to examine the 
interface between the Regulation and arbitration. This was a result from the critique that 
followed the reform. The expert group's task involved the examination of every aspect 
of the interface between arbitration and the Regulation. The expert group gave its 
recommendations to the Commission in the autumn of 2010. However, the result of the 
expert group's assessment is covered by the secrecy of the drafting procedure and has 
thus not been presented in public.184 
 
After the consultation, the Commission presented its proposal for a revised Regulation 
in Debember 2010.185 The proposal includes a specific rule on the relation between 
arbitration and court proceedings. It obliges a court seised of a dispute to stay 
proceedings if its jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement and 
an arbitral tribunal has been seised of the case or court proceedings relating to the 
arbitration agreement have been commenced in the Member State of the seat of the 
arbitration. This modification was asserted to enhance the effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements in Europe, preventing parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and 
eliminating the motivation for abusive litigation tactics.186 The Commission states in its 
proposal that Member States cannot by their own means ensure that arbitration 
proceedings in their Member State are properly coordinated with court proceedings 
going on in another Member State, since the effect of national legislation is limited by 
the territoriality principle. Action at EU level was therefore deemed necessary.187 
 
In the proposal for the new Regulation four main deficiencies were identified: 1) the 
procedure of exequatur, 2) access to justice in the EU, 3) the efficacy of choice of court 
agreements, and 4) the interface between arbitration and the Regulation. The overall 
purpose of the revision was to further develop the European judicial area by abolishing 
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remaining obstacles in favour of the free circulation of judgments in accordance with 
the principle of mutual trust. The proposal refers to the Stockholm Programme188 and 
the goals set out there by the European Council.189 
 
Taking into consideration the interface between arbitration and the Regulation, many 
arbitration associations expressed their concern regarding the effect of any regulation on 
the leading role of the European arbitration centre on a global level.190 On the other 
hand, many stakeholders recognised the problems in question and supported future 
proceedings. The viewpoints diverged regarding the best way in which to proceed, i.e. 
either by actively favouring arbitration agreements or by excluding arbitration from the 
scope of the Regulation in a broader respects.191 
 
It is thus evident that the Commission through its proposal has abandoned the 
standpoint it took in the Green Paper, i.e. that the Regulation would be applicable also 
on arbitration. The Commission has not accepted the position in the Parliament's 
Resolution either, in which an expansion of the arbitration exclusion was suggested. 
Instead the proposal provides a third basis, i.e. that the arbitration exclusion is kept 
unaltered and that arbitration thus continuously falls outside the Regulation's scope of 
application, but that the interface between arbitration and Regulation shall be regulated 
in a better way than earlier, in order to prevent parallel proceedings.192 
 
According to the proposal, a new Recital (11) should be inserted in the preamble of the 
Regulation: 
                                                
188 At a meeting in Brussels on 10 and 11 December 2009 the European Council adopted a new 
multiannual programme called 'The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting citizens’. The Stockholm Programme sets out the EU’s priorities for the area of justice, 
freedom and security for the period 2010-14. Building on the achievements of its predecessors the 
Tampere and Hague programmes, it aims to meet future challenges and further strengthen the area of 
justice, freedom and security with actions focusing on the interests and needs of citizens. 
189 COM (2010) 171, final, of 20 April 2010. Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions – 
Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens, Action Plan implementing the 
Stockholm Programme, p. 19. 
190 ’Arbitration has become an industry sector generating considerable turno- ver1 at the preferred 
arbitral seats around the world.2 Against this back- ground it does not come as a surprise that 
competition for the best place to arbitrate is increasingly played hardball.’ Illmer 2011, p. 646. 
191 The Commission’s proposal COM (2010) 748, p. 5. 
192 Knuts 2011, s. 503. 
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 This Regulation does not apply to arbitration, save in the limited case 
 provided for therein. In particular, it does not apply to the form, existence, 
 validity or effects of  arbitration agreements, the powers of the  arbitrators, 
 the procedure before arbitral  tribunals, and the validity, annulment, and 
 recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.193 
 
The proposal also included a statement that the efficiency of arbitration agreements 
needs improvement in order to give full effect to the parties' will. This would be the 
case especially when the seat of arbitration is situated in a Member State. The 
Regulation would thus include a specific rule, the purpose of which would be to avoid 
parallel proceedings and the use of abusive procedural tactics. The seat of arbitration 
would imply a place the parties have chosen or a place that has been appointed by an 
arbitration tribunal or by some other authority that has been directly or indirectly chosen 
by the parties.194 
 
According to the proposal, arbitration is thus still excluded from the scope of 
application of the new Regulation, but instead an additional recital has been added to 
Article 1(2)(d) that now regulates that it is not applicable on arbitration, except in the 
cases stated in Article 29(4) and 33(3). 
 
Article 29(4) was suggested as follows: 
 
Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, the 
courts of another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of 
an arbitration agreement shall stay proceedings once the courts of the Member 
State where the seat of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have 
been seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an incidental 
question, the existence, validity or effects of that arbitration agreement. 
 
This paragraph does not prevent the court whose jurisdiction is contested from 
declining jurisdiction in the situation referred to above if its national law so 
prescribes. 
 
Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreement are 
established, the court seised shall decline jurisdiction. 
                                                
193 COM (2010) 748 final, p. 15. 
194 COM (2010) 748, p. 16. 
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In other words the new article contains a rule that regulates the relationship between 
arbitration and court proceedings, which did not exist prior to the revision. According to 
the Proposal, in case the defendant objects that a court is not competent, the court must 
stay proceedings if the defendant initiates an arbitration proceeding, the seat of which is 
situated in the EU, or pleads a case in a Member State court where the seat of arbitration 
is situated, and the arbitration tribunal or the court is obliged to decide on the existence, 
validity of effect of the arbitration agreement.195 
 
Article 33(3) was proposed as follows: 
 
For the purposes of this Section, an arbitral tribunal is deemed to be seised 
when a party has nominated an arbitrator or when a party has requested the 
support of an institution, authority or a court for the tribunal's constitution. 
 
It is specified in the proposal what Article 29(4) refers to and that arbitration 
proceedings have been initiated. Arbitration proceedings are considered initiated when a 
party has appointed an arbitrator or requested that an institution, a public authority or a 
court shall appoint the arbitration board.196 
 
4.1.2 European Parliament 
 
Nowadays the legislative power of the EU is divided between the European Parliament 
and the Council, which has been cut out for increasing EU democracy. The Parliament 
constitutes the most important discussion forum of the EU, where the most central 
political and national views of the Member States are brought forward.197 The European 
Parliament and the Council together enact a regulation, a directive or a decision based 
on the European Commission's proposal.198 
 
 
                                                
195 Knuts 2011, p. 504. 
196 Ibid, p. 505. 
197 Raitio 2013, p. 134. 
198 Article 289(1) TFEU. 
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The Parliament’s resolution 
 
With the European Parliament's resolution,199 the Parliament's Committee on Legal 
Affairs gave its report as an answer to the Green Paper. In the resolution the Parliament 
draws the conclusion that arbitraton is regulated in a satisfactory way by the New York 
Convention and by the 1961 Geneva Convention. Thus, the standpoint of the Parliament 
is that the arbitration exclusion ought to be kept unaltered in the Regulation and it 
strongly opposes even a partial abolition of the exclusion.200 The rules of the New York 
Convention are considered minimun rules and the Member States are free to include 
legislation in favour of the competence of arbitration boards and arbitration agreements 
if they consider it necessary. The Parliament also states that it could result in 
considerable disturbances if exclusive competence would be prescribed to the Member 
State court where the seat of arbitration is situated, in the way that is suggested in the 
Heidelberg Report.201 
 
The Parliament touches upon the need for a continued access to the use of anti-suit 
injunctions as one of many national procedural tactics for the support of arbitration. The 
effect of such proceedings, and the court order that follows in the other Member State, 
must be left to fall under the scope of the law in that Member States, as the case was 
prior to the judgment in West Tankers. 
 
Regarding the regulation of arbitration, the Parliament opposes an abolishment of the 
arbitration exclusion, even a partial one. According to the Parliament not only 
arbitration, but also legal proceedings where the subject matter or an ancillary or 
preliminary question deals with the examination of the competence of arbitration 
tribunals or the validity of their decisions, would not fall under the scope of the 
Regulation. 
 
Moreover, the Parliament believes that Article 31 of the Regulation ought to be 
                                                
199 European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (2009/2140 (INI)). 
200 Ibid, see paras 9-11. 
201 Knuts 2011, p. 502. 
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broadened with a paragraph according to which a judgment should not be recognised if 
the court in the original Member State also has rendered a judgment concerning the 
validity or the extent of an arbitration clause, and in that connection disregarded a rule 
on arbitration in the Member State where enforceability is sought, if the judgment in 
that Member State does not give the same result as if the arbitration law of the Member 
State where enforceability was sought had been applied.202 This should also be clarified 
in a recital. 
 
The Parliament’s proposal 
 
In June 2011, the European Parliament published its Draft Report.203 The report, in 
which the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has been 
taken into consideration, a new recital (11)204 is presented, according to which the 
Regulation shall not apply on arbitration. 
 
 The Parliament’s new recital (11) was suggested to read as follows: 
 
This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regulation 
should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a 
matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration 
agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration or from staying or 
dismissing the proceedings and from examining whether the arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in 
accordance with their national law.  
 A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an 
 arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
 performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid 
 down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on this as a 
 principal issue or as an incidental question. 
 On the other hand, where a court, exercising jurisdiction under this 
 Regulation or under national law, has determined that an arbitration 
                                                
202 European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and review of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (2009/2140(INI)), para. 10. 
203 Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
(COM (2010) 748 – C7-0433/2010 – 2010/0383(COD)) 28.6.2011. 
204 The European Parliament’s Proposal, p. 12-14. 
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 agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this 
 should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from 
 being recognised and, as the case may be, enforced in  accordance with this 
 Regulation. This should be without prejudice to the competence of the 
 courts of the Member States to decide on the recognition and enforcement of 
 arbitral awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and 
 Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958, 
 which takes precedence over this Regulation. 
 
This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating 
to, in particular, the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, the powers of the 
arbitrators, the conduct of the arbitration procedure or any other aspects of 
such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning the annulment, 
review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award.  
 
 There must be a connection between proceedings to which this Regulation 
 applies and the territory of the Member States. Accordingly, common rules of 
 jurisdiction should, in principle, apply when the defendant is domiciled in a 
 Member State. 
 A defendant not domiciled in a Member State should in general be  subject to the 
 national rules of jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member State of 
 the court seised. 
 However, in order to ensure the protection of consumers and  employees, 
 to safeguard the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States in situations 
 where they have exclusive jurisdiction and to respect party autonomy, certain 
 rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of the 
 defendant’s domicile. 
 
The Parliament is of the opinion that the impact of arbitration agreements must be 
improved to more effectively in order to give full effect to the parties' will, especially 
when the agreed or decided seat of arbitration is in a Member State. 
 
The Commission recommends special rules to avoid parallel proceedings and the use of 
abusive procedural tactics in such circumstances. Regarding this matter the EESC joins 
the Parliament's position that was presented in the Green Paper. In other words, that 
arbitration is sufficiently covered by the New York and Geneva Conventions. All 
Member States are members of both Conventions, and therefore the arbitration 
exclusion must remain unchanged in the Regulation. The above-mentioned Recital (11) 
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would be available to clarify the legal situation.205 
 
4.1.4 Council of the European Union 
 
The Council of the European Union nowadays constitutes a user of legislative power 
together with the European Parliament206, since the use of so called ordinary legislative 
procedure has grown more common. 207  In the current situation, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that the Council is the central user of legislative power, since the 
former EC Article 202 has been revoked in connection with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty.208 
 
On 6 December 2012, the Council adopted the revised Regulation on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.209 As 
recommended by the Council, the amended Regulation includes a recital on 
arbitration210, which seems more elaborate and thus requires some analysis. Recital (12) 
reads as follows: 
 
 This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regulation 
 should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a 
                                                
205 The European Parliament’s Draft Report of 28 June 2011 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (COM(2010)0748 – C7-0433/2010 – 
2010/0383(COD)), p. 6. 
206 The Council enacts secondary law, generally in cooperation with the Parliament. The Council has to 
reach its decisions unanimoulsy or through a majority decision in accordance with Article 238 TFEU or 
with a qualified majority. 
207 The ordinary legislative procedure gives the same weight to the European Parliament and the Council 
of the European Union on a wide range of areas (for example, economic governance, immigration, 
energy, transport, the environment and consumer protection). The European Parliament and the Council 
adopt the vast majority of European laws jointly. 
208 The content of Article 202 EC has been altered. The corresponding rules are Article 16(1) TEU and 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
209 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (recast). 
210 Recital 12 in the preamble of Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. The reason why the recital is 
now numbered 12 is because the addition of a new recital 11 based on the Proposal for a regulation 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (COM (2013) 554 final), which includes the so-called “patent 
package” in the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. Recital 11 now contains a clarification of the term 
‘court’: “For the purposes of this Regulation, courts or tribunals of the Member States should include 
courts or tribunals common to several Member States, such as the Benelux Court of Justice when it 
exercises jurisdiction on matters falling within the scope of this Regulation. Therefore, judgments given 
by such courts should be recognised and enforced in accordance with this Regulation”. 
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 matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration 
 agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or 
 dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the  arbitration 
 agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed,  in 
 accordance with their national law.  
 
 A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an 
 arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
 performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and  enforcement 
 laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on this as 
 a principal issue or as an incidental question.  
 
 On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction 
 under this Regulation or under national law, has determined that an arbitration 
 agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this 
 should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from 
 being recognised or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this 
 Regulation. This should be without prejudice to the competence of the courts of 
 the Member States to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
 awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
 of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958 (‘the 1958 New 
 York Convention’), which takes precedence over this Regulation. 
 
 This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings 
 relating to, in  particular, the estab- lishment of an arbitral tribunal, the 
 powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other 
 aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment  concerning the 
 annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award. 
 
 Recital (12) repeats the arbitration exclusion and defines its scope through some 
clarifications. It clearly states that Member State courts have the right to refer parties to 
arbitration, stay or dismiss proceedings, or examine the validity of an arbitration 
agreement. However, the rulings on the validity of an arbitration agreement are not 
subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement of the Regulation—although the 
same does not apply to the substance of the dispute. Moreover, the recital grants 
precedence to the New York Convention over the Regulation and allows the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards by Member State courts according to the former, 
even if the arbitral award conflicts with a judgment of another Member State court. 
Finally, the proceedings ancillary to arbitration, such as the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal, the conduct of arbitration or the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or 
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enforcement of an arbitral award, do not fall within the Regulation’s scope.211 
 
The main question arising from the wording of recital (12) is whether it provides a 
sufficient legal basis for interpretation of the arbitration exception in a way that would 
allow the reintroduction of anti-suit injunctions in the tool case of lawyers in the EU 
context. The answer may be interpreted as negative since the requirement of mutual 
trust remains intact. Thus, a Member State court has no authorisation to grant an anti-
suit injunction in relation to proceedings brought in another Member State in breach of 
an arbitration agreement. 
 
Summary 
 
As has been observed, the preparative work on the new Regulation shows an 
inconsistency in opinions. The Heidelberg report included two improvement 
suggestions: to either completely exclude the arbitration exclusion to ensure the 
precedence of the New York Convention, or alternatively through clarifying the 
interface between arbitration and the Regulation. The first suggestion was presented 
together with a new Article 22(6) in the Regulationen that in its turn would solve the 
issue of which courts should have exclusive jurisdiction in ancillary proceedings 
supporting arbitration. The question of where the place of arbitration is was to be solved 
in a recital. The report also suggested adding a new Article 27A to resolve the issue of 
parallel proceedings. 
 
The Green Paper suggested a partial abolishment of the arbitration exception, due to the 
opinion that arbitration agreements should be given the strongest possible effect and 
that the New York Convention provides sufficient rules in that matter. It also proposed 
adding a special rule regulating the jurisdiction in order to ensure legal protection. 
 
Concerning the validity of arbitration agreements, a rule of conflict should be added to 
provide information on which Member States’ legislation will become applicable on an 
                                                
211 See the Council’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast). 
2010/0383 (COD), p. 61. 
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arbitration agreement in a specific situation. An additional rule was proposed that would 
give permission to refuse the recognition of a judgment that is incompatible with an 
arbitration agreement that has been recognised in accordance with the New York 
Convention. According to the Green Paper an alternative to this could also be to award 
the court where the arbitration agreement was created exclusibe competence to confirm 
the enforcement of the judgment as well as procedural fairness. Afterwards the 
judgment could circulate freely in the EU. A third alternative proposed the use of 
Article VII of the New York Convention to further simplify the recognition of 
arbitration awards on EU level. 
 
The statement in the European Parliament’s answer to the Green Paper was that the 
New York and Geneva Conventions regulate arbitration in a satisfactory way. 
Therefore, the arbitration exclusion ought to be kept unaltered in the Regulation, and it 
strongly opposed even a partial abolition of the exclusion. The opinion was that 
abolition could result in considerable disturbance if exclusive competence would be 
prescribed to the Member State court where the seat of arbitration is situated, in the way 
that is suggested in the Heidelberg report. The Parliament also touched upon the need 
for a continued access to the use of anti-suit injunctions as one of many national 
procedural tactics for the support of arbitration, i.e. a restorement of the situation pre 
West Tankers. Moreover, the Parliament proposed a broadening of Article 31 of the 
Regulation with a paragraph according to which a judgment should not be recognised if 
the court in the original Member State also has rendered a judgment concerning the 
validity or the extent of an arbitration clause, and in that connection disregard a rule on 
arbitration in the Member State where enforceability has been sought. For further 
clarification, a complementing recital was suggested. 
 
The Commission’s proposal included a specific rule on the relationship between 
arbitration and court proceedings. Through its proposal, the Commission evidently 
abandoned the position it had taken in the Green Paper. The Commission did not accept 
the standpoint in the Parliament’s resolution either, in which an expansion of the 
arbitration exclusion was presented. The proposal instead included a third basis, that the 
arbitration exclusion was to be kept unaltered but with an added recital as well as a 
special rule in order to avoid parallel proceedings and the use of abusive procedural 
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tactics. It proposed that the Regulation should not be applicable on arbitration, with the 
exception of the cases stated in 29(4) and 33(3), articles that constituted new additions 
to the Regulation. 
 
4.2 Assessment of the Revision 
The new Regulation introduces some key changes originally aiming to make the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments given by courts in Member States easier and 
more effective. However, contrary to the arbitration community’s expectations, the 
Regulation has not fully clarified the interface between the Regulation and arbitration. 
 
In the new Regulation, international arbitration has been specifically excluded from the 
Regulation’s material scope in a similar way that international arbitration was excluded 
from Article 1(2)(d) of the current Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. The main argument for 
excluding international arbitration from these regulations is that the Council evidently is 
trying to preserve the smooth operation of the New York Convention. 
 
We now arrive at the question of what objectives lay beneath this line of development. 
After West Tankers it was argued among others things that the risk of frustrating the 
arbitration process is particularly high when a party initiates legal proceedings in a 
Member State where the judicial process is particularly slow and/or complex, or more 
likely to favour a local litigant. This could entail unanticipated and potentially 
significant costs incurred in dealing with the foreign court proceedings.212 Furthermore, 
such court proceedings parallel to the arbitral proceedings could ultimately lead to two 
conflicting decisions based on the same legal content, i.e. an arbitral award and a 
national court judgment, which are irreconcilable. 
 
The debate regarding the regulation of arbitration in the EU has thus been loud mostly 
because of the economic point of view of keeping arbitration out of reach from EU 
legislation and ensuring speed and cost-efficiency. In many cases the debate also 
originate from common law-countries, where anti-suit injunctions are better known and 
                                                
212 Ippolito & Adler-Nissen 2013, p. 2. 
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accepted as a procedural tactic used in arbitration. The reason for the outcome in West 
Tankers however was the Court aiming to preserve the goals set out by the Regulation, 
i.e. promoting the principle of mutual recognition between the Member States and 
securing the legal protection of parties’ that have arrived at an arbitration agreement, 
and subsequently not intervening in arbitration more than is absolutely necessary. 
 
What remains unresolved though is the issue of parallel legal and arbitral proceedings. 
By not giving court decisions on the validity of arbitration agreements binding effect, 
the EU legislators have accepted that legal proceedings and arbitral proceedings 
concerning the same substance may occur. Thereby, the EU legislators have also 
accepted the related risk of divergent decisions, or at least left this to be resolved by the 
courts of the Member States in casu. However, if an arbitration clause is clearly 
formulated and not open to any doubt as to its validity, the national courts should have 
no reason not to refer the parties to arbitration.213 
 
Juxtaposed, the first and second paragraphs of recital (12) seem to eliminate the 
malicious use of anti-suit injunctions. The first paragraph allows for the courts of the 
seat to rule on the validity of an arbitration agreement, even if this issue has already 
been raised before another court. The second paragraph provides that, if the foreign 
court reaches a decision on this matter, it has no binding effect on other Member State 
courts, which are therefore free to give their own ruling. The beneficial effect of these 
clarifications is that while parallel court proceedings may still be brought in foreign 
courts, such proceedings will not prevent arbitral proceedings from commencing or 
continuing with support from the courts of the seat.214 
 
The third paragraph of recital 12 is the mirror image of the second one. It explains that 
even though a preliminary decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement is in 
itself not subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement in the new Regulation, the 
judgment on the merits of the matter should still be recognised and/or enforced. 
Furthermore, the paragraph adds that the new Regulation does not interfere with the 
                                                
213 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in West Tankers, para. 73. 
214 Ippolito & Adler-Nissen 2013, p. 6. 
  
57 
rules on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the New York Convention.215 
 
These statements seem obvious and reasonable. But, at the same time, they highlight 
that the new Regulation does not fully solve the issue of parallel legal and arbitral 
proceedings. The fourth paragraph of recital 12 emphasises that the arbitration 
exception also covers court proceedings related to or in support of the arbitral process 
(ancillary proceedings). The examples given seem merely to codify what the Court has 
already stated in its case law. 
 
The new recital (12) does appear to provide for a more arbitration-friendly interpretation 
of the Regulation, and the fourth paragraph of the recital does expressly state that 
ancillary proceedings related to the arbitral process fall outside its scope. The legality of 
anti-suit injunctions would however require a clear legal basis in the wording of the new 
Regulation. 
 
In conclusion, the clarifications of the new Regulation are welcome but, obviously, they 
do not provide a clear insight in future scope of the arbitration exclusion and there are 
also still som deficiencies left unsolved. For example, it does not provide for a solution 
regarding a party seeking to enforce an arbitral award in a Member State where a 
national court has held the arbitration agreement invalid. Similarly, a party dissatisfied 
with the judgment on the validity of an arbitration agreement could initiate proceedings 
in another Member State, since the latter’s court is not bound by the first decision as it 
falls outside the scope of the Regulation. In the end, the EU legislators seem to have 
opted more or less for a status quo, since the absence of a clear wording still in practice 
permits parallel proceedings and abusive litigation tactics that challenge international 
arbitration. Whether the new Regulation will have an impact on arbitration and any 
form of anti-suit injunction to protect arbitration will be permitted in the EU will 
probably take years of court practice to clarify. 
 
Arbitration matters are excluded from the Regulation, whether the matter in question is 
preliminary or not. Thus, the Court’s core holding, from which every other position in 
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its decision derives, has been vitiated by recital (12) of the Recast.216 It will be much 
more difficult to assert that an anti-suit injunction preventing such a ruling is within the 
scope of the Regulation.217 Recital (12) says that ‘nothing in the Regulation’ should 
prevent a Member State court from examining an arbitration agreement for validity. 
However, an anti-suit injunction to protect arbitration is not ‘in the Regulation.’ Rather, 
it could be considered an ancillary proceeding, which is not covered by the Regulation. 
Those related actions or ancillary proceedings to which the Regulation should not apply 
are dealt with in the fourth paragraph of recital (12).218 
 
It is clear that the different opinions mainly express a positive stance towards keeping 
arbitration outside the scope of the Reguation. The problem seems to be reaching an 
agreement on how the ‘loopholes’ should be filled in order to simultaneously secure 
legal protection and the principle of mutual trust in the EU. The predominance of the 
New York Conventions is also undisputable. It is obvious that the preparatory phase 
aroused an intensive debate concerning the function of the arbitration exclusion. The 
fact that the Regulation had worked in a satisfactory way came up several times in the 
different opinions, and also the sufficient functioning of the New York Convention. 
However, after West Tankes it was clear that the matter had to be regulated in some 
way. The exclusion itself had not earlier caused any problems, but arbitration 
proceedings still needed a detailed definition in relation to general principles of EU law. 
 
An unaltered Article 1(2)(d) that excludes arbitration from the scope of the Regulation 
therefore formulated the result presented by the Council, along with an added 
explanatory recital (12). It is quite obvious that this solution is a compromise based on 
the strong views that arbitration needs to be kept outside the influence of EU law. 
However, the added recital codifies the guidelines set earlier by the Court and justifies 
the Court’s potential involvement in future cases regarding arbitration proceedings. 
However, the length and complexity of the recital does not really make the legal 
                                                
216 Opinion of Moses, M. in ’Will Antisuit Injunctions Rise Again in Europe?’. (Moses 2013) 
217 Ibid. 
218 ‘The Regulation should not apply to any actions or ancillary proceedings relating to, in particular, the 
establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure 
or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning the annulment, 
review, appeal, recognition of enforcement of an arbitral award.’ 
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situation more transparent or predictable for future implementation. It also seems like 
the compromise amounts to an attempt to cover every aspect, which in practice waters 
out the effect the added recital could have disclosed, already in advance. 
 
5 EXCLUDING ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE – THE 
REVISED BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
 
Above in Chapter 3 the outlines of the Court’s rulings in matters concerning arbitration 
have been summarised. In this chapter an attempt to take the aforementioned cases and 
apply the new Regulation on them is presented. This thesis thus includes an assessment 
of whether the revised Regulation will change the legal situation regarding future 
arbitration practices in the EU. As has been noted, the arbitration exclusion still exists 
unchanged in the new Regulation, but recital (12) has been added to the preamble to 
explain the situations that cases Marc Rich, Van Uden and, especially, West Tankers 
have proven difficult. 
 
5.1 Case law hypothesis – recital (12) 
Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation still simply states, ‘This Regulation shall not apply 
to… arbitration.’ A clarifying recital has nevertheless been added to the preamble in the 
new Regulation. Recital (12)219 of the new Regulation has been presented above in 
section 4.1.4. 
 
In comparison with Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, which did not contain a claryfing 
recital regarding the interpretation of the arbitration exclusion, the added recital now 
specifies the link between the Regulation and arbitration. The recital specifically states 
that New York Convention takes precedence over the Regulation in arbitration 
proceedings. But it also clarifies that where a Member State court exercising jurisdiction 
under the Regulation or under national law has determined that an arbitration agreement 
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is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, should not prevent that 
court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from being recognised and enforced in 
accordance with this Regulation, however in context with the New York Convention. 
 
Marc Rich and Van Uden indicated a rather broad interpretation of the arbitration 
exclusion, whereas in West Tankers, the interpretation of the Court was narrower. It is 
now left to see what future case law will look like, and whether the Court will succeed 
in creating consistent guiding principles as to the interpretation of Article 1(4)(d) of the 
new Regulation and the consistency with the principle of mutual trust. 
 
5.1.1 Marc Rich-hypothesis 
 
The happenings in Marc Rich have been described above, in section 3.2.1 
 
In order to determine the scope of application of the Brussels Convention, one must 
look at the subject matter of the dispute. If the subject matter of the main dispute is for 
instance the appointment of an arbitrator, the Convention does not become applicable. If 
there is an ancillary matter that the court must resolve in order to resolve the main 
dispute, the Convention does also not become applicable. This constitutes a broad 
interpretation of the arbitration exclusion in that the whole procedural setting arbitration 
in motion is covered by the exclusion. 
 
In Marc Rich the question is about one party denying that the proceedings pending 
before the national court concerns the appointment of an arbitrator. The 'principal or 
real dispute between the parties', it contended, relates to the existence of an arbitration 
agreement. Without doubt, that question appears at the present stage of the proceedings 
to be the most important. From the procedural point of view, it is merely an incidental 
issue or a preliminary issue. According to one party, the question of the existence of an 
arbitration agreement must be settled before the appointment of an arbitrator can be 
proceeded with.220 
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It is clearly stated in recital (12) that excluding arbitration from the scope of the 
Regulation is intended to be interpreted rigidly. The recital specifically states that other 
Member States cannot interfere, except when it comes to the determination whether an 
agreement exists at all; Advocate General Darmon also brought up this matter in his 
opinion in Marc Rich.221 A judgment determining whether an arbitration agreement is 
valid or not, or, because it is invalid, ordering the parties not to continue the arbitration 
proceedings was not covered by the Brussels Convention.222 Part of recital (12) in the 
new Regulation also states that a bruling given by a Member State Court as to whether 
or not an arbitration agreement valid should not be subject to the rules of recognition 
and enforcement set out in the Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on 
this as a primary or ancillary issue. However, if the court considers the agreement 
unvalid, this judgment should be recognised and enforceable in the EU in accordance 
with the third section of recital (12) of the new Regulation. 
 
The new Regulation is still intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, and to give 
way to the New York Convention, and so my conclusion in the Marc Rich-hypothesis is 
that the outcome of the case essentially would be the same on the basis of Regulation 
(EU) No 1215/2012, i.e. that the matter falls outside the scope of application of the new 
Regulation and that the guidelines in the New York Convention are sufficient. 
 
5.1.2 Van Uden-hypothesis 
 
A description of Van Uden is presented above, in section 3.2.2. 
 
The arbitration exclusion in the Brussels Convention was intended to be very broad, 
including proceedings before national courts. However, if the subject matter of court 
proceedings is not preliminary, but rather parallel to arbitration proceedings, the 
Brussels Convention remains applicable if the subject matter of the parallel process falls 
within the scope of the Convention (author’s emphases). 
 
                                                
221 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-190/89, para. 24. 
222 OJ 1979 C 59, p. 93, para. 64. 
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In Van Uden, the question concerns interim measures, which, according to the Brussels 
Convention, are not in principle preliminary to arbitration proceedings but are ordered 
in parallel to such proceedings and are intended as measures of support. They concern 
the protection of a wide variety of rights rather than arbitration as such. The scope of the 
Convention was thus determined by the nature of the rights the interim measures served 
to protect. 
 
In the hypotethical case of Van Uden being played out on the basis of the new 
Regulation, the first thing to note is that Article 24 of the Brussels Convention has been 
altered. The corresponding article is Article 31 of the new Regulation, which reads as 
follows: 
 
 Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any 
 court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that 
 court. 
 
 Without prejudice to Article 26, where a court of a Member State on which 
 an agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive  jurisdiction is 
 seised, any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such 
 time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no 
 jurisdiction under the agreement. 
 
 Where the court designated in the agreement has established jurisdiction  in 
 accordance with the agreement, any court of another Member State shall 
 decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
 
 Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to matters referred to in Sections 3, 4 or 5 
 where  the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance 
 contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee is the claimant  and 
 the agreement is not valid under a provision contained within those 
 Sections. 
 
 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention has also been changed, and accordning to the 
new Regulation Article 5(1) persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the 
courts of another Member State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2-7 of 
Chapter II in the new Regulation. However, the same content as in Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels Convention can be retrieved in Article 7(1)(a) in the new Regulation.223 
                                                
223 Article 7(1)(a) states that a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State 
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In Van Uden, the Court ruled that since the subject matter of the case concerned is 
arbitration, the Brussels Convention is therefore not applicable. According to the new 
Regulation, my conclusion is that the subject matter will also not be arbitration in a case 
like this. Moreover, the Court ruled that on a proper construction, the granting of 
provisional or protective measures on the basis of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention 
is conditional on, inter alia, the existence of a real connecting link between the subject 
matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State of 
the court before which those measures are sought. 
 
However, even though the Court had ruled that the subject matter in Van Uden was not 
arbitration, and that the Brussels Convention thus would be applicable in the case, the 
result may not have been the same on the basis of the new Regulation, because of 
Article 31. Whereas Article 24 of the Convention stated that ‘[a] pplication may be 
made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provisional, including protective, 
measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this 
Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter’, Article 31(1) of the new Regulation states that ‘[t] hese actions 
come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any court other than the court 
first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court’. Consequently, based on 
Article 31(1) of the new Regulation, the subject matter would not matter as such, since 
Article 31(1) specifically prohibits any other court than the court first seised to take 
action, and so to avoid parallel proceedings. 
 
5.1.3 West Tankers-hypothesis 
 
A description of West Tankers is provided above, in section 3.2.3. 
 
The restriction of a person from commencing/continuing proceedings in another 
Member State on the ground that it is breach of an arbitration agreement constituted the 
use of an anti-suit injunction. The case is interconnected with March Rich and Van 
                                                                                                                                          
n matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question. 
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Uden and concerns the existence of an arbitration clause. The English court’s grant of 
an anti-suit injunction to uphold the arbitration agreement was incompatible with the 
Regulation because it strips other Member State courts of the ability to examine their 
own jurisdiction, and thus violates the principle of mutual trust between Member States. 
 
Also, anti-suit injunctions were considered incompatible because of the fact that they 
stop other courts from taking legal proceedings regarding the validity or applicability of 
an arbitration agreement. By referring to an arbitration agreement it deprives a party 
from the possibility of pleading the case in the court where it brought action based on 
the Regulation. Thus, it constitutes a deprivation of a form of legal protection. 
 
In West Tankers, the deficiency of the interface between the Regulation and arbitration 
hit its peak, and this case is the main reason why the discussion around the revision of 
the Regulation has been so heated. Some commentators have been agitated because of 
the prohibition of using anti-suit injunctions as a means to ensure efficient arbitration 
proceedings, and many commentators and legal scholar believed that the new 
Regulation would have dealt with the deficiency more clearly. On the other hand, 
arbitration stakeholders have also been quite satisfied of the status quo and the potential 
weakening of the arbitration exclusion. 
 
The conclusion is that the function of the anti-suit injunction is ‘baked’ into recital (12), 
in stating that the Regulation should not apply to arbitration, and that nothing in the 
Regulation should prevent a Member State court, when seised of an action in a matter in 
respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from referring 
the parties to arbitration, from staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining 
whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, in accordance with its national law. 
 
The recital also explains that a ruling given by a Member State court as to whether or 
not an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down 
in the Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or 
as an incidental question. This implies that the issue with parallel proceedings has been 
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dealt with in a quite satisfactory manner. It also implies that the principle of mutual trust 
does not apply in arbitration proceedings that fall outside the scope of the Regulation. 
 
However, recital (12) also declares that where a Member State court, exercising 
jurisdiction under the Regulation or under national law, has determined that an 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this 
should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from being 
recognised or enforced in accordance with the Regulation. This part of the recital also 
confirms the priority of the New York Convention. However, it looks like this second 
part of the recital is the mirror image of the first part, which may prove to be rather 
confusing. 
 
To sum up, based on recital (12) in the preamble of the new Regulation, nothing in the 
Regulation prevents the courts of a Member State from examining whether the 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in 
accordance with their national law. Consequently, anti-suit injunctions used as torpedo 
actions are not compatible with the new Regulation. 
 
Lastly, the recital declares that the Regulation should not apply to ancillary proceedings 
relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of 
arbitrators, the conduct of arbitration proceedings or any other aspects of such 
proceedings. Moreover, the Regulation should not apply to any action or judgment 
concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral 
award. 
 
This last part of recital (12) clearly restates the question of subject matter, which has 
been the main outcome of Marc Rich and Van Uden. Accordingly, when the subject 
matter of a case is arbitration, the new Regulation is not applicable on the ancillary 
proceedings or actions relating to the arbitration proceedings. Manifestly, it is left to the 
courts of the Member States to interpret the question of subject matter in casu. 
 
My conclusion concerning the hypotethical West Tankers case and the outcome of it 
based on the new Regulation and recital (12) is that the Court has manifested its earlier 
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case law and through this advocates the competence of the national courts to examine 
their own jurisdiction. Therefore the outcome would be more or less the same today, 
since West Tankers quite obviously has motivated the wording of the recital, and the 
legislator has undoubtedly used it s a base to codify the result in a recital in order to 
ensure a consistent interpretation in future cases, and thereby also promote 
transparency.224 
 
5.2 Trading torpedos for trust? 
According to Born essential to the arbitral process is the freedom of parties, and 
arbitrators, to proceed with their chosen dispute resolution mechanism to a final award, 
which only then may be subject to judicial review.225 The emphasis in Europe on e.g. 
procedural fairness and the principle of mutual trust is sometimes mocked in less 
controlled states such as the United States that promote an effective arbitration system 
for businesspersons. 
As a conclusion of the hypotethical part above, the conclusion is that the Court and the 
EU legislators clearly have promoted general EU principles, such as the principle of 
adequate legal protection, before efficient procedural tactics supporting arbitration, such 
as anti-suit injunctions. However, the addition of the recital (12) also improved the 
protection of arbitral proceedings from abusive torpedo actions that have a harmful 
effect on arbitration proceedings. 
Recital (12) allows for the courts of the seat of arbitration to rule on the validity of an 
arbitration agreement, even if the issue has already been raised before another Member 
State court. Furthermore, it provides that, if the foreign court reaches a decision on this 
matter, it has no binding effect on other Member State courts, which are therefore free 
to give their own ruling. The beneficial effect of these clarifications is that while 
parallel court proceedings may still be issued in foreign courts, such proceedings will 
not prevent arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing with support from the 
                                                
224 For more on the transparency challenge in the EU, see Tiili, V. Transparency – An Everlasting 
Challenge in Cardonnel, in Rosas & Wahl 2012, p. 473-485. 
225 Born 2009, p. 1033. 
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courts of the seat of arbitration.226 In order to determine whether an anti-suit injunctions 
is justified or not, one would have to look into every case to see whether the lawyers are 
using it as a tool rather than something that has merit in the particular case. Lew for 
instance states that past cases reviewed to see how most arbitrators react to anti-suit 
injunctions show that it is clear that the injunctions were used as a device to stop or 
delay the arbitration process, and thus crippling the arbitration process.227 
Knowing that the Member State courts now are able to rule in a case with the support of 
the Regulation and that they cannot lose competence because of fired torpedo actions, it 
will lead to an enhanced level of trust and improved judicial cooperation. However, the 
revision still shows some weaknesses that need to be addressed in the future in order to 
clarify these issues. While the Commission is setting up rules with the Member States 
and the execution of EU policies in mind, it must not be forgotten that these very states 
are members of other conventions and treaties as well. The ratification of a treaty or 
convention brings obligations that the members need to fulfil. Setting up rules that 
contravene the obligations under such conventions puts the Member States in the 
uncomfortable position to decide whether to follow the affected convention or whether 
to adhere to EU rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
226 Ibid. 
227  Lew, Julian D. M. Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts. To Prevent Arbitration 
Proceedings, in Gaillard 2005, p. 27. 
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6 WHERE ARE WE HEADING? – SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
 
‘The text of a regulation might seem clear enough but capable of a surprising result if 
interpreted literally.’ 
 
Ronald Dworkin228 
 
 
 
Complex cases, which raise several intertwined questions either as a matter of claim or 
as defence where some of the issues could fall outside the scope of the Regulation, are 
undisputably difficult. The case law lacks real consistency and the problems are 
particularly intricate. The issues mainly relates to ancillary matters, indirectly raised 
claims, preliminary issues or preliminary proceedings, defences, incidental questions 
and provisional measures.229 
 
Based on the information presented above we have now seen that the arbitration 
exception in the Regulation, though explicit, was in practice somewhat watered out by 
the Court that interpreted the arbitration exclusion narrowly and expanded the scope of 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to comprise matters ancillary to arbitration, widening the 
opportunity for parallel proceedings, leading to extended disputes and prohibiting the 
use of anti-suit injunctions against other Member States’ court proceedings in breach of 
an agreement to arbitrate. The cases seem to indicate that the principal subject matter of 
the dispute is an excluded matter, for instance arbitration, and then the entire dispute is 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation, including any incidental or preliminary 
matter that would otherwise be included. Provisional measures in support of civil and 
commercial claims that would otherwise be excluded, under Article 1(2)(d) are within 
the ambit of the Regulation. 
 
                                                
228 Dworkin 2006, p. 6. 
229 Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p. 66. 
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If the main subject matter of the proceedings is not an excluded matter, it appears that 
the proceedings are within the scope of the Regulation. This is so despite the possibility 
of incidental, preliminary or ancillary matters falling outside the scope of the 
Regulation.230 This proposition includes any defences raised. Proceedings, which do not 
directly derive from an excluded matter, are included within the scope of the 
Regulation.231 Given that the Regulation allows declaratory proceedings, a well-advised 
litigant may take advantage of local law to fram the issues in the proceedings to fall 
within or without the Regulation to its benefit.232 
 
In particular, in West Tankers, the Court referred to the general rule that apart from a 
few exceptions the Regulation does not empower a court of one Member State to rule 
on jurisdiction of a court of another Member State. It also found that anti-suit 
injunctions run counter to the principle of mutual trust between the Member States if 
they hinder the court of another Member State in the exercise of the powers conferred 
on it by the Regulation, namely ‘to decide, on the basis of the rules defining the 
material scope of the Regulation, including Art. 1(2)(d), whether the Regulation is 
applicable’. Broadly speaking, this means that according to the Court, court 
proceedings related to arbitration fall within the scope of the Regulation and thus 
outside the arbitration exception. Consequently, issuing an anti-suit injunction to 
prevent those proceedings would be inconsistent with the Regulation, as this would 
prevent the court from exercising the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. This in 
practice could frustrate the arbitration process severely, especially in cases where a 
party initiates proceedings in a Member State characterised by a slow and/or 
complicated judicial system. In addition, such court proceedings parallel to the arbitral 
proceedings could ultimately lead to two conflicting decisions on the same substance. 
 
The revised Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 included an attempt to clarify the confusing 
legal situation by adding a recital to the preamble describing the meaning and use of 
Article 1(2)(d). The recital however, trying to include all the different situations that 
have been discussed based on the Court's preliminary rulings affecting arbitration in the 
                                                
230 Jenard report, p. 10. 
231 Ibid, p. 12. 
232 Magnus & Mankowski 2007, p. 66. 
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EU, is also confusing in that it seemingly contradicts itself in stating both that anti-suit 
injunctions are prohibited and that courts do have the right to examine their own 
jurisdiction (even though the principal goal is to refer the parties to arbitration if an 
arbitration agreement exists). This may not really abolish the use of malicious anti-suit 
injunctions in reality, since they are still a possibility in practice. 
 
The question is whether starting legal proceedings in a national court, knowing the 
consequences it causes (and potentially knowing that the arbitration agreement could be 
contested in a court), constitutes an illegal procedural tactic when used maliciously, and 
does it in that case have the same legal definition as in a case where one of the parties 
genuinely questions the arbitration agreement and needs the protection of possible court 
proceedings examining the agreement in front of a national court. 
 
Essentially, the matter is about giving different legal definitions to the same act. The 
legislator has probably considered this, but has still concluded that the principle of 
mutual trust has a stronger foothold than protecting party confidentiality in arbitration. 
Moreover, it is clear from the recital that the intention of the new Regulation indeed is 
to exclude arbitration, and the point of departure in regulating the competence of 
national courts is not to cripple arbitration proceedings, but to protect the exercise of the 
powers conferred on the national courts by the Regulation. 
 
EU law has always been destined to form a complete legal order based on a solid 
construction of fundamental rights or principles and even though it is founded on the 
principle of conferral from the Member States, it has developed as a ‘supranational legal 
order’.233 When it comes to judge-made law and different interpretative methods, the 
question of transparency will probably always remain somewhat unsatisfactory, in the 
sense that it is almost impossible to attain in a rapidly changing society and social 
structure. 
 
So where are we heading? Comparing Koulu’s view back in 2007 that an intervention 
from the EU on arbitration is far away in the future with the development that 
                                                
233 Arestis 2013, p. 12. 
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commenced around the same time, it can probably be agreed that the EU arbitration 
scene, although widely discussed, has remained rather unintervened, and the result of 
the revision is more or less status quo.234 It has been said that the intensive debate is a 
result of the increasing popularity of arbitration as an alternative conflict resolution, 
which has caught commentators’, and also the Commission’s attention.  
 
The situation we dwell in at the moment is unsatisfactory. Although it might be possible 
to justify the principles in relation to the assumption of jurisdiction under the 
Regulation, the problem is merely then postponed to the matter of recognition and 
enforcement of any judgment given. The new Regulation includes an attempt to solve 
these deficiencies, mainly through recital (12). But, as we have seen, the recital only 
provides assistance to some extent, and it seems that we stand before a revision that 
chose status quo instead of presenting any revolutionary renovations to the arbitration 
exclusion. 
 
We can only attempt to paint a picture of the future concerning arbitration in the EU, 
but the fact is that we will have to sit tight and wait for proceedings to happen and the 
Court to issue further rulings on the interpretation of the revised Regulation, and most 
importantly, whether EU law will become applicable in a particular case, since that is a 
prerequisite for the Regulation to come into question at all in arbitration proceedings. 
                                                
234 See Koulu 2007, p. 301. 
